Saudi Arabia–Houthi War:
The Makkah Defence Pact
Faces Its First Real Test
The Houthis survived a decade of war. Now their missiles, drones and Red Sea advance are testing Saudi Arabia’s security, Pakistan’s strategic choices, Türkiye commitment and the limits of a new collective-defence pact.
Freelance Senior Columnist | Author | Geopolitical Analyst | Strategic Book Reviewer
Published: September
22, 2026
Estimated Reading Time: 9–10 minutes
The renewed Saudi-Houthi confrontation is testing the credibility and practical limits of the new Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.
Executive Summary
Saudi Arabia is again facing a serious Houthi threat from Yemen, but this time the danger extends beyond another round of missile and drone attacks. The Houthis have expanded their positions along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, while attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure have increased pressure on the kingdom’s oil-export network. On September 19, Saudi Arabia intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh. The Houthis also claimed attacks on Saudi energy facilities, although some claims remain unverified.
The escalation has come only weeks after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. The pact commits the three countries to collective defence, but its institutions are still developing. The crisis is therefore becoming its first serious test: can collective defence provide practical security without drawing its members into another long Middle Eastern war?
Introduction
For more than a decade, Saudi Arabia has tried to contain the Houthi movement along its southern border. Yet in September 2026, the Houthis are again threatening Saudi cities, energy infrastructure and strategic routes around the Red Sea.
This time,
however, Saudi Arabia has a new collective-defence arrangement with Pakistan
and Türkiye. The renewed confrontation is therefore about more than Yemen. It
raises three larger questions: Can Riyadh contain the Houthis? What will
Pakistan and Türkiye do if Saudi Arabia seeks military assistance? And can the
crisis be controlled without triggering a wider Middle Eastern war?
A Small Yemeni Movement Became a Regional Power
The Houthis,
formally known as Ansar Allah, grew from Yemen’s Zaydi Shia community in the
north. Their roots lie in a religious and political revival movement that
emerged during the 1990s. From 2004, they fought repeated wars with Yemen’s
government and gradually developed from a local insurgency into a powerful
political and military organisation.
In 2014, the
Houthis seized Sanaa. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily the following year in
support of Yemen’s internationally recognised government. Despite Saudi
advantages in air power, money and technology, the movement survived years of
military pressure and developed increasingly sophisticated missile and drone
capabilities.
Iran has
provided important military and technical support, but describing the Houthis
simply as an “Iranian proxy” misses part of the picture. They have Yemeni
roots, their own leadership, territory and political objectives. Iran has
influence, but that does not necessarily mean control over every Houthi
decision. Reuters’ recent profile similarly describes how the movement evolved
from a small mountain militia into a major regional threat.
Why Saudi Arabia and the Houthis Remain Enemies
The
Saudi-Houthi conflict is sometimes reduced to a Sunni-Shia struggle, but
religion alone cannot explain it. For Riyadh, the central issue is security. A
heavily armed movement along Saudi Arabia’s southern border can launch missiles
and drones against cities, airports and oil infrastructure while also
threatening Red Sea shipping.
The Houthis see
the conflict differently. They regard Saudi military intervention and
restrictions on Houthi-held territory as aggression against Yemen. Senior
Houthi official Mohammed al-Bukhaiti told the Associated Press that the
movement remained open to peace but demanded an end to Saudi restrictions. He
also warned other countries against joining the Saudi campaign.
Both sides therefore define security differently. Saudi Arabia seeks protection from Houthi weapons, while the Houthis demand relief from Saudi military and economic pressure. More than a decade of conflict has failed to resolve that fundamental contradiction.
The Makkah Pact Has Met the War Earlier Than Expected
Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement on August 7. The
official agreement says an armed attack against one of the three states will be
regarded as an attack against all. On August 31, their foreign and defence
ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul and agreed to establish a
permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and deepen defence-industry and
technology cooperation.
The pact is
sometimes described in the media as an “Islamic NATO,” but the comparison has
limits. NATO has decades of integrated military planning and established
command structures. The Makkah pact is new, and Pakistan itself has described
its operationalisation as being at an early stage.
The current
crisis therefore does not prove that the pact has failed. It does show that its
first major test has arrived before its institutions are fully developed.
Deterrence requires potential adversaries to believe that members will act
together when necessary, while collective defence does not automatically mean
joining every military operation involving an ally.
Pakistan’s Dilemma: What Happens If Riyadh Calls?
Pakistan faces
a particularly difficult strategic choice. Islamabad strongly supports Saudi
sovereignty and security, but it also describes the Makkah agreement as
defensive and says it is not directed against another country.
There is an
important difference between defending Saudi territory and entering the war
inside Yemen. Pakistan could provide intelligence, air-defence support,
training, logistics or technical assistance without deploying combat forces
into Yemen. Such support could still give practical meaning to collective
defence.
Islamabad must
also manage its relationship with neighbouring Iran while dealing with its own
security and economic pressures. Public reporting has not established that
Pakistan has committed to offensive operations in Yemen. The more useful
question, therefore, is not why Pakistan is refusing to help Saudi Arabia, but
what it would do if Riyadh formally sought specific military assistance under
the pact.
The answer
could define the agreement’s credibility. Defensive assistance to Saudi
airspace and critical infrastructure would be very different from participation
in an offensive campaign inside Yemen.
Türkiye Has Moved One Step Further
Türkiye has
taken a somewhat clearer public position. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on
September 19 that Saudi Arabia could have military requirements because of the
Houthi attacks and that Türkiye was prepared to help under the trilateral
agreement, particularly with technical military needs.
That does not
mean Turkish troops are entering Yemen. It does show that collective defence
can include missile defence, intelligence, radar, drones, electronic warfare
and other technical assistance rather than a large ground intervention.
The Houthis are
watching these developments closely. Al-Bukhaiti has warned countries against
joining Saudi Arabia and said the movement could fight on multiple fronts.
Pakistan and Türkiye therefore face the same broad challenge: giving the Makkah
pact practical meaning without becoming drawn into an open-ended Yemeni war.
Saudi Arabia’s Oil Problem Is Becoming a Security
Problem
The most
important strategic dimension may lie beyond the battlefield. Saudi Arabia’s
East-West Pipeline carries crude from eastern production areas towards Yanbu on
the Red Sea, providing an alternative to exports through the Strait of Hormuz.
Recent attacks have exposed the vulnerability of this network.
Saudi Arabia’s
problem is therefore not simply how much oil it can produce, but how reliably
it can move that oil to international markets. The East-West Pipeline, Hormuz
and the Red Sea are interconnected parts of the same export system. Pressure on
one route increases dependence on another. This vulnerability was also central
to the research material used for this article.
Reuters
reported on September 21 that Saudi oil flows through Hormuz had risen to about
2.9 million barrels per day, compared with roughly 700,000 barrels per day in
August, as disruption affected western export routes. The result is a strategic
paradox: infrastructure intended partly to reduce dependence on Hormuz is under
pressure just as instability around the Red Sea is increasing.
Saudi Arabia
may still possess enormous oil reserves and production capacity. The harder
question is whether it can move those supplies safely, reliably and at
acceptable cost when several routes are exposed simultaneously.
Bab el-Mandeb Gives the Houthis Strategic Leverage
The latest
battlefield developments make that question more important. Reuters reported on
September 21 that Houthi forces were pushing towards strategic highlands in
Taiz and Lahij after major gains along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The fighting is
increasing pressure around the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s
most important maritime chokepoints.
The Houthis say
their current maritime campaign is aimed at Saudi-linked shipping rather than
international shipping generally, so Bab el-Mandeb should not be described as
completely closed. Yet control of territory around a chokepoint creates
leverage even while commercial vessels continue to pass. Higher perceived risk
can increase insurance premiums and freight costs and force shipping companies
to reconsider routes.
That is how a
Yemeni conflict can produce economic consequences far beyond Yemen. The wider
strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb deserves separate examination, but the
present crisis already demonstrates how geography can give the Houthis influence
far greater than Yemen’s economic weight.
Can the Houthis Actually Be Tamed?
Saudi Arabia
entered the Yemen war in 2015 with overwhelming advantages in money, air power
and military technology, yet the Houthis survived and adapted. They developed
missile and drone capabilities, strengthened local networks and learned to
operate under sustained military pressure. That record makes it difficult to
assume that another bombing campaign alone can eliminate the movement.
Saudi Arabia
can intercept missiles, strike launch sites and damage Houthi military
infrastructure. But punishment is not the same as control. The experience of
the past decade suggests that military pressure has not produced a durable
political settlement.
A narrower
objective would be to limit the Houthis’ ability to threaten Saudi cities,
energy infrastructure and international shipping while supporting conditions
for a political settlement inside Yemen. This distinction also matters for
Pakistan and Türkiye because defensive assistance could strengthen Saudi
security without requiring either country to join another ground war.
Iran Has Influence, but the Houthis Have Their Own
Power
Iran remains
central because its military and technical relationship with the Houthis has
strengthened the movement’s capabilities. Yet the Houthis have also developed
their own political interests and territorial power. Iranian
influence should therefore not automatically be treated as complete operational
control.
The
international dimension is becoming clearer. Reuters reported that China had
urged Iran to help restrain Houthi attacks following a Saudi appeal, as threats
to Saudi oil exports began affecting broader energy calculations. When Beijing
becomes involved because oil routes are under pressure, Yemen is no longer only
a local civil war.
The international pressure widened
further on September 22 when G7 foreign ministers condemned the continuing
Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and called on Iran to end its military support
for the movement. They also urged the Houthis to halt threats and attacks
against civilian shipping and return to the political process. The statement
shows how a conflict rooted in Yemen is increasingly being treated as a threat
to international trade and wider regional stability.
For Riyadh,
diplomacy with Tehran may therefore remain important, but it cannot replace
engagement with the political and military realities inside Yemen.
The Real Test of the Makkah Pact
The Makkah pact
should not be judged solely by whether Pakistani or Turkish troops enter Yemen.
Its more meaningful test is whether the three countries can create credible
collective defence without widening the war.
If Saudi Arabia
needs missile defence, intelligence, technical assistance or better protection
for critical infrastructure, the speed and effectiveness of support from
Pakistan and Türkiye will reveal more about the pact than political
declarations. Maritime cooperation and defence-industry coordination could also
become increasingly important.
If the members
can provide practical security while keeping diplomatic channels open, the
agreement could develop into a meaningful regional defence framework without
trying to reproduce NATO. If cooperation remains largely declaratory while
Saudi strategic infrastructure stays exposed, questions about its practical
value will naturally increase. An alliance establishes credibility through what
it can deliver when pressure arrives.
Conclusion: The Houthis Have Changed the Question
The Houthis
began as a movement rooted in northern Yemen. Today, they can threaten Saudi
cities, pressure energy infrastructure and influence calculations around one of
the world’s most important maritime routes. Their transformation matters more
than any single missile or drone attack.
More than a
decade of conflict has shown that Saudi Arabia’s conventional military
superiority does not automatically produce political control. The Houthis have
combined local roots, difficult terrain, asymmetric weapons, political
endurance and external assistance to survive a far wealthier opponent. The
central challenge is therefore to contain their military reach without allowing
the confrontation to expand into another wider regional war.
The Makkah
Defence Pact now faces that same reality. Pakistan and Türkiye can strengthen
Saudi Arabia through intelligence, technology, air defence and maritime
security without necessarily joining offensive operations inside Yemen. How the
three countries translate the pact’s collective-defence language into practical
action will determine how much strategic weight the new arrangement carries.
Saudi Arabia’s
vulnerability is also geographical. Its wealth comes from beneath the ground,
but that wealth must pass through pipelines, ports and narrow waterways before
reaching world markets. The Houthis do not need to defeat Saudi Arabia
conventionally to create strategic pressure. They need only to make Saudi
defence more expensive, its export routes less certain and the choices facing
its partners more difficult.
That is why the present confrontation is more than another Saudi-Houthi war. It is the first serious test of whether a new regional defence pact, advanced military technology and Saudi economic power can contain the leverage created by asymmetric warfare, geography and political endurance.
And immediately beyond Yemen lies the next part of that story: Bab el-Mandeb.
About the Author
Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit) is an Indian author, geopolitical
analyst and strategic book reviewer who has been associated with the
Janmabhoomi Group of Newspapers as a freelance Senior Columnist for more than
25 years. He has written extensively on international affairs, geopolitics and
strategic issues. His work also focuses on defence and military affairs,
emerging technologies, global security, and India’s evolving role in the
international order.
Selected References
Reuters — Houthis push for control of Yemen highlands, September 21, 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-push-control-yemen-highlands-trump-reported-have-called-off-airstrikes-2026-09-21/?
Reuters — Türkiye says
it could help meet Saudi military needs under defence pact, September 19, 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/turkey-says-it-could-help-meet-saudi-military-needs-under-defence-pact-2026-09-19/?
Associated Press — Houthi warning over wider intervention, September 20, 2026
https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-iran-saudi-arabia-red-sea-93dfe17125c63897b232f6461d81d85c
Associated Press — Saudi Arabia confirms attempted ballistic-missile attack on Riyadh,
September 19, 2026
https://apnews.com/article/yemen-saudi-arabia-b1286cad816dd3e553f50f6dd5205972
Associated Press — what closure of Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline means for oil flows
https://apnews.com/article/saudi-pipeline-oil-iran-war-efa431e2fa771e34880c8453c62ffb92
Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Makkah Agreement Strategic Political and Defence
Committee Joint Statement, August 31, 2026
https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/strategic-political-and-defence-committee-of-the-makkah-agreement-for-joint-defence-joint-statement?
Reuters
- G7 foreign ministers call on Iran to stop arming Houthis
Disclaimer
This article is an independent analysis based on publicly available information, official statements, credible media reports, and open-source research. It is intended for informational and analytical purposes only. The views and interpretations expressed are those of the author. While I have made every effort to ensure factual accuracy, developments may change as new information becomes available.
Editorial Transparency & Full Disclosure
This is an
independently researched and authored analysis. Advanced digital tools and AI
were used solely for supplementary support tasks, including research
cross-referencing, translation verification, image generation, and grammatical
refinement. The core analytical insights, strategic conclusions, and creative
direction are entirely the author’s own.
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