India’s Naval
Power 2026:
INS Dunagiri, Sanshodhak and Agray Reshape
Indo-Pacific Deterrence
By Mitin Sheth
(Shanilohit)
Originally
Published: June 26, 2026 | Revised: August 13, 2026
Estimated
Reading Time: 9–10 minutes
India’s maritime strength is no longer measured simply
by the number of warships it possesses. The larger question is whether the Navy
can see farther, operate longer, protect its coastline and respond across the
vast Indian Ocean when required.
Introduction
India's strategic future is inseparable from the sea. Much of its trade
and energy lifeline passes through the Indian Ocean, while China's expanding naval
reach and Pakistan's submarine capabilities have made the maritime domain
increasingly important to national security.
Against this background, the commissioning of INS Dunagiri, INS
Sanshodhak and INS Agray on June 21, 2026 carries significance beyond the
addition of three ships.
Each performs a very different role: Dunagiri brings sophisticated
surface-combat capability, Sanshodhak strengthens hydrographic surveying and
maritime knowledge, while Agray is designed for anti-submarine operations in
shallow coastal waters.
Together, they reveal something important about India's naval
modernisation: New Delhi is building not merely a larger fleet, but a more
balanced and increasingly indigenous one.
Executive Summary
The simultaneous commissioning of INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS
Agray reflects three complementary requirements of Indian maritime
strategy—blue-water combat capability, maritime domain awareness and protection
of coastal approaches.
Their significance also lies in how they were built. The three platforms
involve more than 200 Indian MSMEs and contain over 75% indigenous content,
demonstrating how naval modernisation is becoming closely connected with
India's domestic defence-industrial strategy.
They will not by themselves alter the Indo-Pacific balance. But together
with India's wider fleet expansion, they strengthen the country's ability to
protect the Indian Ocean, monitor its maritime environment and contribute to
regional security without depending entirely on foreign-built platforms.
Three Ships, Three Different Maritime Requirements
The importance of the June commissioning lies precisely in the
differences between the three vessels.
A modern navy cannot consist only of destroyers, frigates or aircraft
carriers.
It needs vessels capable of fighting far from home, ships that
understand and map the maritime environment, and specialised platforms able to
defend ports and coastal waters against submarines.
INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray address these requirements at
different levels.
That makes their simultaneous induction particularly interesting.
India is effectively strengthening three layers of maritime capability
at once: combat power, knowledge of the operating environment and
anti-submarine defence closer to shore.
INS Dunagiri: Stealth and Blue-Water Combat Power
Of the three vessels, INS Dunagiri naturally attracts the greatest
attention.
It is the fifth ship of the Nilgiri-class under Project 17A and
represents the continuing evolution of India's indigenous frigate programme.
The ship incorporates design measures intended to reduce radar, infrared and
acoustic signatures and carries modern sensors and weapons, including BrahMos
surface-to-surface missiles and the Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile system.
That combination matters because the Indian Navy increasingly has to
think beyond coastal defence.
China's naval expansion has changed the maritime environment across
Asia. The People's Liberation Army Navy possesses a growing blue-water
capability, and Chinese naval activity in the wider Indian Ocean has become
part of India's long-term strategic calculation.
India therefore needs surface combatants capable of protecting sea
lanes, operating with carrier groups, conducting anti-surface and anti-air
warfare and maintaining a credible presence far from the Indian coastline.
Dunagiri contributes to that requirement.
No single frigate changes the balance against China. Naval power is
cumulative. It comes from numbers, logistics, submarines, aircraft,
surveillance, maintenance, weapons stocks and the ability to sustain operations
over distance.
But each modern indigenous frigate reduces a capability gap and adds
another deployable platform to India's blue-water fleet.
INS Sanshodhak: The Power of Knowing the Ocean
INS Sanshodhak demonstrates another side of naval power that receives
far less public attention.
It is a Survey Vessel (Large), and its primary value lies in
hydrography—the measurement and mapping of the maritime environment.
That may sound less dramatic than missiles and frigates, but modern
naval operations depend upon accurate knowledge of depth, seabed conditions,
navigational hazards and oceanographic characteristics.
Submarines operate beneath the surface.
Ships navigate through difficult waters.
Ports and channels must be charted.
Maritime infrastructure must be understood and protected.
Accurate hydrographic information supports all of these activities.
Sanshodhak can therefore contribute to better maritime domain awareness
and safer naval operations while also supporting civilian navigation and
India's wider hydrographic responsibilities.
This has diplomatic value as well.
India has long provided hydrographic assistance and maritime
capacity-building to friendly countries. Such cooperation strengthens
relationships without requiring military alliances and supports India's
ambition to be regarded as a reliable security and development partner across
the Indian Ocean.
The ship may carry fewer headlines than Dunagiri.
Its information, however, can be strategically invaluable.
INS Agray: Hunting Where Larger Ships Cannot
The third layer is represented by INS Agray.
Agray is an Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft designed for
operations closer to the coast. Its role becomes increasingly important because
submarines remain one of the most difficult threats for any navy to detect and
neutralise.
Deep-ocean anti-submarine warfare is only part of the problem.
Ports, harbours and coastal approaches also require protection. Shallow
waters create difficult acoustic conditions and can provide hostile submarines
with opportunities to operate close to strategically important infrastructure.
Pakistan's investment in submarine capability makes this especially
relevant for India.
China's growing undersea capability adds a wider strategic dimension.
Agray and other vessels of its class therefore strengthen an area that
is sometimes overshadowed by larger surface combatants: the defence of India's
littoral waters against underwater threats.
Its significance is not that it will hunt submarines across the entire
Indian Ocean.
It is that specialised vessels free larger warships to perform the
missions for which they were designed while providing a dedicated capability
where shallow-water ASW matters most.
The Real Strength Is in the CombinationSeen individually, the three ships perform very different missions.
Seen together, they reveal the logic behind a balanced navy.
Dunagiri can operate as a sophisticated surface combatant.
Sanshodhak improves knowledge of the maritime environment.
Agray strengthens anti-submarine protection in coastal waters.
Combat capability without information is incomplete.
Information without the ability to act upon it has limited deterrent
value.
And blue-water strength means little if ports and coastal approaches
remain vulnerable.
The Indian Navy therefore needs all three layers.
This is why the commissioning should not be understood simply as the
arrival of three new hulls.
It represents three pieces of a much larger maritime system.
China Changes the Scale of India’s Maritime Challenge
India's naval modernisation cannot be separated from China's rise as a
maritime power.
For decades, India's primary military planning was overwhelmingly
continental. The Himalayan frontier and Pakistan understandably dominated
strategic attention.
That calculation has changed.
China's economic dependence on maritime trade, its expanding navy and
its strategic interests across the Indian Ocean have brought Chinese maritime
power much closer to India's principal sphere of interest.
Beijing does not need permanent combat deployments near India to
influence New Delhi's calculations.
Regular submarine visits, survey activity, access to overseas facilities
and sustained PLAN deployments can themselves compel India to devote greater
resources to maritime surveillance and preparedness.
India consequently faces a difficult challenge.
It must maintain sufficient military strength on its land borders while
simultaneously building a navy capable of operating across an ocean bearing its
name.
That requires sustained investment over decades rather than occasional
bursts of procurement.
Pakistan Presents a Different Naval Problem
Pakistan cannot match India ship-for-ship, nor does it need to.
Its submarine capability offers a more economical method of threatening
Indian surface vessels and complicating operations in the Arabian Sea.
For India, this means numerical superiority alone is insufficient.
Anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, sonar
networks and specialised vessels such as Agray become increasingly important.
The objective is not merely to destroy an enemy submarine after it
attacks.
Effective ASW attempts to detect, classify and track underwater threats
early enough to deny them freedom of operation.
That is why the less glamorous elements of naval modernisation can
sometimes matter as much as aircraft carriers and destroyers.
The Bay of Bengal: Gateway Rather Than Fortress
The Bay of Bengal deserves particular attention, but I would avoid
describing it simply as an Indian “fortress.”
Its strategic importance is broader.
The Bay connects India's eastern seaboard with Bangladesh, Myanmar and
Southeast Asia and provides access towards the Malacca Strait. It carries
commercial traffic, energy flows and strategic communication routes.
It is also an area in which India seeks cooperation with neighbouring
states.
India's objective should therefore be strong maritime awareness and the
ability to protect its interests without turning the Bay into an unnecessarily
confrontational space.
Sanshodhak's surveying capabilities, Agray's littoral role and the
ability of larger platforms such as Dunagiri to operate eastward all contribute
to India's position.
But lasting influence in the Bay of Bengal will depend on diplomacy and
economic partnerships as much as naval power.
That distinction matters.
A secure neighbourhood is ultimately more valuable than a militarised
one.
Aatmanirbhar Bharat Moves From Slogan to Shipyard
Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the commissioning is not
visible from the deck of any of the three ships.
It is the industrial ecosystem behind them.
All three were constructed by Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers
in Kolkata, with participation from more than 200 MSMEs and indigenous content
exceeding 75%. Indian industry also supplied the specialised steel used in
their construction.
That matters strategically.
Warships remain in service for decades. During that time they require
maintenance, spare parts, upgrades, ammunition and technical support.
A navy dependent excessively on foreign suppliers can discover during a
geopolitical crisis that procurement relationships are themselves strategic
vulnerabilities.
Domestic shipbuilding does not eliminate foreign dependence overnight.
Many sophisticated components and technologies still involve international
partnerships.
But every increase in indigenous design, construction and systems
integration gives India greater control over the lifecycle of its fleet.
There is also an economic dimension.
Naval shipbuilding supports engineers, skilled workers, electronics
companies, steel producers and hundreds of smaller suppliers.
Defence modernisation, when successfully indigenised, therefore creates
industrial capacity as well as military capability.
From Vikrant to the New Frigates
The three vessels are part of a much larger transformation.
INS Vikrant demonstrated India's ability to design and construct an
indigenous aircraft carrier.
Project 15B destroyers strengthened major surface combat capability.
The Project 17A frigate programme is progressively adding modern stealth
combatants.
India continues to expand its submarine, anti-submarine and support
fleets.
Indeed, only weeks after the Kolkata tri-commissioning, another
Nilgiri-class frigate, INS Mahendragiri, entered service in July 2026.
The important question is no longer whether India can build sophisticated
naval platforms.
It clearly can.
The next challenge is whether it can build them rapidly enough, in
sufficient numbers and with reliable indigenous supply chains to match the pace
at which the Indo-Pacific security environment is changing.
That is a much harder test.
Where the QUAD Fits—and Where It Does Not
India's maritime capabilities also strengthen its ability to cooperate
with the United States, Japan and Australia.
But the nature of the QUAD should be understood carefully.
It is not NATO in the Indo-Pacific, nor is it a formal
collective-defence alliance.
Its maritime relevance lies more in cooperation, information sharing,
maritime domain awareness, capacity building, exercises and the shared interest
of maintaining a free, open and stable Indo-Pacific.
India's stronger Navy therefore benefits QUAD cooperation without
requiring India to abandon strategic autonomy.
This is particularly important for New Delhi.
India wants partnerships.
It does not want dependence.
A more capable indigenous Navy gives India precisely that freedom.
The stronger India becomes at sea, the more useful it becomes to its
partners—and the less it needs those partnerships to substitute for its own
national capability.
Deterrence Is More Than Firepower
The word “deterrence” is often associated with missiles, submarines and
weapons.
But maritime deterrence is broader.
An adversary must believe that its movements can be detected.
It must believe that India can respond.
It must know that Indian forces can remain at sea for sustained periods.
And it must calculate that any attempt to disrupt India's maritime
interests will impose unacceptable costs.
Dunagiri contributes combat power.
Sanshodhak contributes knowledge.
Agray contributes specialised underwater defence.
India's wider naval network supplies the remaining elements.
That is why these three ships matter more collectively than their
individual specifications might suggest.
Conclusion: Three Ships, One Larger Maritime Message
INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray will not transform the
Indo-Pacific balance by themselves.
Nor should their commissioning be portrayed as though India has suddenly
solved every maritime challenge posed by China or Pakistan.
Their significance is more substantial than such dramatic claims.
They demonstrate the direction in which India's naval power is moving.
One ship strengthens blue-water combat capability.
Another strengthens the country's understanding of the maritime
environment.
The third protects vulnerable coastal approaches against underwater
threats.
And all three emerge from an increasingly capable domestic shipbuilding
ecosystem.
India's maritime future will ultimately depend not upon one
commissioning ceremony but upon whether this process can be sustained—more
indigenous platforms, faster construction, stronger maintenance capability,
deeper surveillance and the industrial capacity to support the fleet during
both peace and conflict.
The Indian Ocean is becoming more strategically contested.
India cannot choose whether that transformation occurs.
It can choose how prepared it will be when it does.
The commissioning of Dunagiri, Sanshodhak and Agray suggests that New
Delhi increasingly understands the scale of that responsibility.
Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit)
Senior Columnist with Janmabhoomi Group of Newspapers | Author |
Geopolitical Analyst
Selected References
Press Information Bureau / Prime Minister's Office —
“Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi commissions three indigenously designed and
built naval ships – INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray,” June 21, 2026.
Official commissioning record, including indigenous-content and MSME
participation details.
Official PIB releasePress Information Bureau / Ministry of Defence —
“Indian Navy Set to Commission Three Indigenous Naval Platforms in Kolkata,”
June 19, 2026.
Provides the roles and principal capabilities of Dunagiri, Sanshodhak and
Agray, including Dunagiri's BrahMos and MRSAM systems.
Official Ministry of Defence / PIB
releasePress Information Bureau / Ministry of Defence —
“Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi commissions Indian Navy's frontline
platforms,” June 21, 2026.
Official assessment of their contribution to operational capability, maritime
security and domain awareness.
Official Ministry of Defence release
Press Information Bureau / Ministry of Steel — “SAIL
Powers India's Naval Might: Supplies Defense-Grade Steel for INS Dunagiri,
Agray, and Sanshodhak,” June 24, 2026.
Details the 5,700 tonnes of indigenous special-grade steel supplied for the
three vessels.
Official SAIL / PIB release
Press Information Bureau — “India's Defence
Modernisation: Strengthening National Security Through Indigenous Capability,”
July 2026.
Provides wider context on Nilgiri-class frigates and subsequent commissioning
of INS Mahendragiri.
Official PIB defence-modernisation
reference
Disclaimer
This article is based exclusively on publicly available information and
open-source assessments. References to naval strategy and potential security
challenges represent analytical interpretation and do not disclose or claim
access to classified operational information.
"Independently authored work. AI tools were used only for supportive tasks (research, translation, editing, image generation, and grammatical/punctuation correction). Final content and creative direction are the author’s own".
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