India’s Naval Power 2026:

         INS Dunagiri, Sanshodhak and Agray Reshape Indo-Pacific Deterrence

By Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit)

Originally Published: June 26, 2026 | Revised: August 13, 2026
Estimated Reading Time: 9–10 minutes

 India’s maritime strength is no longer measured simply by the number of warships it possesses. The larger question is whether the Navy can see farther, operate longer, protect its coastline and respond across the vast Indian Ocean when required.

Introduction

India's strategic future is inseparable from the sea. Much of its trade and energy lifeline passes through the Indian Ocean, while China's expanding naval reach and Pakistan's submarine capabilities have made the maritime domain increasingly important to national security.

Against this background, the commissioning of INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray on June 21, 2026 carries significance beyond the addition of three ships.

Each performs a very different role: Dunagiri brings sophisticated surface-combat capability, Sanshodhak strengthens hydrographic surveying and maritime knowledge, while Agray is designed for anti-submarine operations in shallow coastal waters.

Together, they reveal something important about India's naval modernisation: New Delhi is building not merely a larger fleet, but a more balanced and increasingly indigenous one.

Executive Summary

The simultaneous commissioning of INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray reflects three complementary requirements of Indian maritime strategy—blue-water combat capability, maritime domain awareness and protection of coastal approaches.

Their significance also lies in how they were built. The three platforms involve more than 200 Indian MSMEs and contain over 75% indigenous content, demonstrating how naval modernisation is becoming closely connected with India's domestic defence-industrial strategy.

They will not by themselves alter the Indo-Pacific balance. But together with India's wider fleet expansion, they strengthen the country's ability to protect the Indian Ocean, monitor its maritime environment and contribute to regional security without depending entirely on foreign-built platforms.

Three Ships, Three Different Maritime Requirements

The importance of the June commissioning lies precisely in the differences between the three vessels.

A modern navy cannot consist only of destroyers, frigates or aircraft carriers.

It needs vessels capable of fighting far from home, ships that understand and map the maritime environment, and specialised platforms able to defend ports and coastal waters against submarines.

INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray address these requirements at different levels.

That makes their simultaneous induction particularly interesting.

India is effectively strengthening three layers of maritime capability at once: combat power, knowledge of the operating environment and anti-submarine defence closer to shore.

INS Dunagiri: Stealth and Blue-Water Combat Power

Of the three vessels, INS Dunagiri naturally attracts the greatest attention.

It is the fifth ship of the Nilgiri-class under Project 17A and represents the continuing evolution of India's indigenous frigate programme. The ship incorporates design measures intended to reduce radar, infrared and acoustic signatures and carries modern sensors and weapons, including BrahMos surface-to-surface missiles and the Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile system.

That combination matters because the Indian Navy increasingly has to think beyond coastal defence.

China's naval expansion has changed the maritime environment across Asia. The People's Liberation Army Navy possesses a growing blue-water capability, and Chinese naval activity in the wider Indian Ocean has become part of India's long-term strategic calculation.

India therefore needs surface combatants capable of protecting sea lanes, operating with carrier groups, conducting anti-surface and anti-air warfare and maintaining a credible presence far from the Indian coastline.

Dunagiri contributes to that requirement.

No single frigate changes the balance against China. Naval power is cumulative. It comes from numbers, logistics, submarines, aircraft, surveillance, maintenance, weapons stocks and the ability to sustain operations over distance.

But each modern indigenous frigate reduces a capability gap and adds another deployable platform to India's blue-water fleet.

INS Sanshodhak: The Power of Knowing the Ocean

INS Sanshodhak demonstrates another side of naval power that receives far less public attention.

It is a Survey Vessel (Large), and its primary value lies in hydrography—the measurement and mapping of the maritime environment.

That may sound less dramatic than missiles and frigates, but modern naval operations depend upon accurate knowledge of depth, seabed conditions, navigational hazards and oceanographic characteristics.

Submarines operate beneath the surface.

Ships navigate through difficult waters.

Ports and channels must be charted.

Maritime infrastructure must be understood and protected.

Accurate hydrographic information supports all of these activities.

Sanshodhak can therefore contribute to better maritime domain awareness and safer naval operations while also supporting civilian navigation and India's wider hydrographic responsibilities.

This has diplomatic value as well.

India has long provided hydrographic assistance and maritime capacity-building to friendly countries. Such cooperation strengthens relationships without requiring military alliances and supports India's ambition to be regarded as a reliable security and development partner across the Indian Ocean.

The ship may carry fewer headlines than Dunagiri.

Its information, however, can be strategically invaluable.

INS Agray: Hunting Where Larger Ships Cannot

The third layer is represented by INS Agray.

Agray is an Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft designed for operations closer to the coast. Its role becomes increasingly important because submarines remain one of the most difficult threats for any navy to detect and neutralise.

Deep-ocean anti-submarine warfare is only part of the problem.

Ports, harbours and coastal approaches also require protection. Shallow waters create difficult acoustic conditions and can provide hostile submarines with opportunities to operate close to strategically important infrastructure.

Pakistan's investment in submarine capability makes this especially relevant for India.

China's growing undersea capability adds a wider strategic dimension.

Agray and other vessels of its class therefore strengthen an area that is sometimes overshadowed by larger surface combatants: the defence of India's littoral waters against underwater threats.

Its significance is not that it will hunt submarines across the entire Indian Ocean.

It is that specialised vessels free larger warships to perform the missions for which they were designed while providing a dedicated capability where shallow-water ASW matters most.

 The Real Strength Is in the Combination

Seen individually, the three ships perform very different missions.

Seen together, they reveal the logic behind a balanced navy.

Dunagiri can operate as a sophisticated surface combatant.

Sanshodhak improves knowledge of the maritime environment.

Agray strengthens anti-submarine protection in coastal waters.

Combat capability without information is incomplete.

Information without the ability to act upon it has limited deterrent value.

And blue-water strength means little if ports and coastal approaches remain vulnerable.

The Indian Navy therefore needs all three layers.

This is why the commissioning should not be understood simply as the arrival of three new hulls.

It represents three pieces of a much larger maritime system.

China Changes the Scale of India’s Maritime Challenge

India's naval modernisation cannot be separated from China's rise as a maritime power.

For decades, India's primary military planning was overwhelmingly continental. The Himalayan frontier and Pakistan understandably dominated strategic attention.

That calculation has changed.

China's economic dependence on maritime trade, its expanding navy and its strategic interests across the Indian Ocean have brought Chinese maritime power much closer to India's principal sphere of interest.

Beijing does not need permanent combat deployments near India to influence New Delhi's calculations.

Regular submarine visits, survey activity, access to overseas facilities and sustained PLAN deployments can themselves compel India to devote greater resources to maritime surveillance and preparedness.

India consequently faces a difficult challenge.

It must maintain sufficient military strength on its land borders while simultaneously building a navy capable of operating across an ocean bearing its name.

That requires sustained investment over decades rather than occasional bursts of procurement.

Pakistan Presents a Different Naval Problem

Pakistan cannot match India ship-for-ship, nor does it need to.

Its submarine capability offers a more economical method of threatening Indian surface vessels and complicating operations in the Arabian Sea.

For India, this means numerical superiority alone is insufficient.

Anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, sonar networks and specialised vessels such as Agray become increasingly important.

The objective is not merely to destroy an enemy submarine after it attacks.

Effective ASW attempts to detect, classify and track underwater threats early enough to deny them freedom of operation.

That is why the less glamorous elements of naval modernisation can sometimes matter as much as aircraft carriers and destroyers.

The Bay of Bengal: Gateway Rather Than Fortress

The Bay of Bengal deserves particular attention, but I would avoid describing it simply as an Indian “fortress.”

Its strategic importance is broader.

The Bay connects India's eastern seaboard with Bangladesh, Myanmar and Southeast Asia and provides access towards the Malacca Strait. It carries commercial traffic, energy flows and strategic communication routes.

It is also an area in which India seeks cooperation with neighbouring states.

India's objective should therefore be strong maritime awareness and the ability to protect its interests without turning the Bay into an unnecessarily confrontational space.

Sanshodhak's surveying capabilities, Agray's littoral role and the ability of larger platforms such as Dunagiri to operate eastward all contribute to India's position.

But lasting influence in the Bay of Bengal will depend on diplomacy and economic partnerships as much as naval power.

That distinction matters.

A secure neighbourhood is ultimately more valuable than a militarised one.

Aatmanirbhar Bharat Moves From Slogan to Shipyard

Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the commissioning is not visible from the deck of any of the three ships.

It is the industrial ecosystem behind them.

All three were constructed by Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers in Kolkata, with participation from more than 200 MSMEs and indigenous content exceeding 75%. Indian industry also supplied the specialised steel used in their construction.

That matters strategically.

Warships remain in service for decades. During that time they require maintenance, spare parts, upgrades, ammunition and technical support.

A navy dependent excessively on foreign suppliers can discover during a geopolitical crisis that procurement relationships are themselves strategic vulnerabilities.

Domestic shipbuilding does not eliminate foreign dependence overnight. Many sophisticated components and technologies still involve international partnerships.

But every increase in indigenous design, construction and systems integration gives India greater control over the lifecycle of its fleet.

There is also an economic dimension.

Naval shipbuilding supports engineers, skilled workers, electronics companies, steel producers and hundreds of smaller suppliers.

Defence modernisation, when successfully indigenised, therefore creates industrial capacity as well as military capability.

From Vikrant to the New Frigates

The three vessels are part of a much larger transformation.

INS Vikrant demonstrated India's ability to design and construct an indigenous aircraft carrier.

Project 15B destroyers strengthened major surface combat capability.

The Project 17A frigate programme is progressively adding modern stealth combatants.

India continues to expand its submarine, anti-submarine and support fleets.

Indeed, only weeks after the Kolkata tri-commissioning, another Nilgiri-class frigate, INS Mahendragiri, entered service in July 2026.

The important question is no longer whether India can build sophisticated naval platforms.

It clearly can.

The next challenge is whether it can build them rapidly enough, in sufficient numbers and with reliable indigenous supply chains to match the pace at which the Indo-Pacific security environment is changing.

That is a much harder test.

Where the QUAD Fits—and Where It Does Not

India's maritime capabilities also strengthen its ability to cooperate with the United States, Japan and Australia.

But the nature of the QUAD should be understood carefully.

It is not NATO in the Indo-Pacific, nor is it a formal collective-defence alliance.

Its maritime relevance lies more in cooperation, information sharing, maritime domain awareness, capacity building, exercises and the shared interest of maintaining a free, open and stable Indo-Pacific.

India's stronger Navy therefore benefits QUAD cooperation without requiring India to abandon strategic autonomy.

This is particularly important for New Delhi.

India wants partnerships.

It does not want dependence.

A more capable indigenous Navy gives India precisely that freedom.

The stronger India becomes at sea, the more useful it becomes to its partners—and the less it needs those partnerships to substitute for its own national capability.

Deterrence Is More Than Firepower

The word “deterrence” is often associated with missiles, submarines and weapons.

But maritime deterrence is broader.

An adversary must believe that its movements can be detected.

It must believe that India can respond.

It must know that Indian forces can remain at sea for sustained periods.

And it must calculate that any attempt to disrupt India's maritime interests will impose unacceptable costs.

Dunagiri contributes combat power.

Sanshodhak contributes knowledge.

Agray contributes specialised underwater defence.

India's wider naval network supplies the remaining elements.

That is why these three ships matter more collectively than their individual specifications might suggest.

Conclusion: Three Ships, One Larger Maritime Message

INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray will not transform the Indo-Pacific balance by themselves.

Nor should their commissioning be portrayed as though India has suddenly solved every maritime challenge posed by China or Pakistan.

Their significance is more substantial than such dramatic claims.

They demonstrate the direction in which India's naval power is moving.

One ship strengthens blue-water combat capability.

Another strengthens the country's understanding of the maritime environment.

The third protects vulnerable coastal approaches against underwater threats.

And all three emerge from an increasingly capable domestic shipbuilding ecosystem.

India's maritime future will ultimately depend not upon one commissioning ceremony but upon whether this process can be sustained—more indigenous platforms, faster construction, stronger maintenance capability, deeper surveillance and the industrial capacity to support the fleet during both peace and conflict.

The Indian Ocean is becoming more strategically contested.

India cannot choose whether that transformation occurs.

It can choose how prepared it will be when it does.

The commissioning of Dunagiri, Sanshodhak and Agray suggests that New Delhi increasingly understands the scale of that responsibility.

Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit)
Senior Columnist with Janmabhoomi Group of Newspapers | Author | Geopolitical Analyst

Selected References

Press Information Bureau / Prime Minister's Office — “Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi commissions three indigenously designed and built naval ships – INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray,” June 21, 2026.

Official commissioning record, including indigenous-content and MSME participation details.
Official PIB release

Press Information Bureau / Ministry of Defence — “Indian Navy Set to Commission Three Indigenous Naval Platforms in Kolkata,” June 19, 2026.

Provides the roles and principal capabilities of Dunagiri, Sanshodhak and Agray, including Dunagiri's BrahMos and MRSAM systems.
Official Ministry of Defence / PIB release

Press Information Bureau / Ministry of Defence — “Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi commissions Indian Navy's frontline platforms,” June 21, 2026.
Official assessment of their contribution to operational capability, maritime security and domain awareness.
Official Ministry of Defence release

Press Information Bureau / Ministry of Steel — “SAIL Powers India's Naval Might: Supplies Defense-Grade Steel for INS Dunagiri, Agray, and Sanshodhak,” June 24, 2026.
Details the 5,700 tonnes of indigenous special-grade steel supplied for the three vessels.
Official SAIL / PIB release

Press Information Bureau — “India's Defence Modernisation: Strengthening National Security Through Indigenous Capability,” July 2026.
Provides wider context on Nilgiri-class frigates and subsequent commissioning of INS Mahendragiri.
Official PIB defence-modernisation reference

Disclaimer

This article is based exclusively on publicly available information and open-source assessments. References to naval strategy and potential security challenges represent analytical interpretation and do not disclose or claim access to classified operational information.

"Independently authored work. AI tools were used only for supportive tasks (research, translation, editing, image generation, and grammatical/punctuation correction). Final content and creative direction are the author’s own".

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Copyright © 2026 Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit). All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the author, except for brief quotations permitted under applicable copyright law.