BRICS 2026:
Did New Delhi Build a Stronger Institution or Just a Bigger One?
From
Global South representation and financial resilience to Middle East diplomacy,
India’s BRICS chairship tested whether an expanded grouping can turn
geopolitical weight into practical influence
By Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit)
Freelance Senior Columnist | Author | Geopolitical Analyst
Published: September 15, 2026 | Estimated
Reading Time: 9–10 minutes
Executive Summary
BRICS
arrived in New Delhi with a problem partly of its own making. The grouping has
expanded far beyond the five countries that gave it its name, increasing its
demographic reach, economic weight and diplomatic visibility. But expansion has
also brought together governments whose strategic interests do not always
align. Iran and the United Arab Emirates now sit in the same forum. India and
China cooperate within BRICS while managing a difficult bilateral
relationship. Russia sees multipolarity partly through its confrontation with
the West, while India maintains deep partnerships with the United States,
Europe, Japan and other Indo-Pacific powers.
The
18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12–13 under the theme
“Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,”
therefore faced a more demanding test than simply demonstrating the
organisation’s size. India’s challenge was to show that an expanded BRICS could
still reach consensus and, more importantly, begin translating political weight
into practical cooperation. The New Delhi Declaration addressed global
governance reform, representation of emerging and developing economies,
economic and financial cooperation, technology, resilient supply chains, and a
range of institutional initiatives. It also produced common language on an
escalating Middle East crisis despite significant differences among members.
New
Delhi did not turn BRICS into a tightly integrated geopolitical bloc, nor did
it resolve the contradictions created by enlargement. What it did was more
modest, and perhaps more useful: it tested whether a bigger BRICS could
gradually become more functional.
Introduction
For
years, much of the international debate around BRICS has revolved around a
dramatic question: can it challenge the Western-led international order?
That
question may now be too narrow.
BRICS
in 2026 is neither a military alliance nor an economic union. Its members do
not share a common foreign policy, and their relationships with Washington,
Beijing, Moscow and one another vary enormously. What increasingly connects
them is dissatisfaction with the distribution of influence inside institutions
created for an earlier balance of global power, combined with an interest in
creating additional channels for trade, finance, development and diplomacy.
India’s
approach to the New Delhi Summit reflected that distinction. Prime Minister
Narendra Modi described India’s chairship as people-centric and
“humanity-first,” built on resilience, innovation, cooperation and
sustainability. The official declaration likewise emphasised a “balanced,
practical, actionable, inclusive, development-oriented and people-centred
approach.” India’s chairship generated more than 400 ministerial,
parliamentary, official, expert, business and people-to-people engagements
across 30 Indian cities, evidence of an effort to deepen the organisation beyond
annual summit diplomacy.
The
important question after New Delhi, therefore, is not whether BRICS has become
larger. That is already evident. The more consequential question is whether
enlargement is being followed by institutional depth.
From
Global South Representation to Global Rule-Shaping
The
strongest political thread running through the New Delhi Declaration is the
demand for a more representative international system.
The
document calls for greater participation of emerging markets and developing
countries, as well as least-developed countries, particularly from Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, in global decision-making. It also
reiterates support for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including
the Security Council, so that developing countries have greater representation
in institutions whose structures still reflect an earlier distribution of
international power.
For
India, this fits into a broader foreign-policy argument. New Delhi does not
need BRICS to dismantle the existing international system. India works extensively through institutions and partnerships within that system.
It cooperates with the United States in the Indo-Pacific, maintains major
economic relationships with Europe, participates in the Quad, remains active in
the G20 and simultaneously works through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation.
That
is not necessarily inconsistency. It expresses strategic autonomy.
India’s
interest is not served by replacing one rigid international hierarchy with
another. It is better served by widening the number of institutions in which it
can exercise influence and by increasing the voice of countries that have
gained economic importance without acquiring equivalent institutional
representation.
This
is why the idea of the Global South matters in New Delhi’s BRICS diplomacy.
India’s argument is not simply that developing countries deserve greater
attention. It is that they should increasingly help write the rules
under which the international system operates.
In
that sense, BRICS offers India something more useful than an anti-Western
platform: it offers another arena for rule-shaping.
Consensus
in a World of Conflicting Interests
The
broader BRICS becomes, the harder consensus becomes.
The
Middle East offered an immediate example. The region is facing another period
of dangerous escalation, with the Iran conflict, disruptions to vital energy
and shipping routes, and wider regional tensions creating economic and security
consequences far beyond the region. Yet BRICS includes Iran and the UAE,
whose strategic relationships and security calculations differ significantly.
Against
that background, agreement on a joint declaration was not automatic.
The
New Delhi Declaration expressed serious concern about escalating tensions in
the Middle East and emphasised dialogue, consultation, diplomacy and peaceful
settlement of disputes. Reuters reported that achieving consensus was
particularly notable given the presence of both Iran and the UAE within the
expanded grouping.
The
summit did not solve the Middle East crisis, and it would be a mistake to
present diplomatic language as a breakthrough peace initiative. Its
significance was narrower but still important. BRICS demonstrated that
countries positioned differently within an active geopolitical confrontation
could remain inside the same diplomatic framework and agree on a minimum common
position.
The meeting also had a revealing bilateral dimension. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian
and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed met in New
Delhi, with regional stability and development among the issues discussed. The
encounter illustrated one of the quieter functions a larger BRICS can perform:
creating diplomatic space around the formal summit even when the
institution itself lacks the authority to mediate a conflict.
India
has long been comfortable with this kind of diplomacy. It maintains relations
with countries that are frequently on opposite sides of regional disputes and
generally resists demands that every partnership be converted into an exclusive
alignment. BRICS, at least in its present form, fits that diplomatic instinct.
The
declaration’s treatment of terrorism also directly concerned India.
Within its broader rejection of terrorism, it condemned the April 22, 2025
terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 people were killed. The distinction
here is important. Collective condemnation of Pahalgam should not be stretched
into a claim that every BRICS member endorsed every subsequent Indian military
action. The diplomatic value lies in the language members actually agreed upon,
not in conclusions imposed on that language afterwards.
For
India, achieving such consensus in an enlarged organisation matters precisely
because members do not approach South Asian security from identical positions.
Financial Resilience Without the Currency Headlines
BRICS
is frequently discussed as if its economic purpose can be reduced to one
question: when will it create a currency capable of challenging the US dollar?
That
framing generates headlines but obscures the more practical work taking place
beneath it.
The
economic agenda emerging from New Delhi is better understood as an attempt to
create options. Financial cooperation, local-currency mechanisms, development
financing and more resilient cross-border arrangements can reduce vulnerability
without requiring members to abandon the existing global financial system.
This
distinction is especially relevant for India. New Delhi has little strategic
reason to exchange dependence on one dominant architecture for dependence on
another. What it does have an interest in is flexibility: more channels through
which Indian businesses can trade, finance projects and settle transactions
when geopolitical tensions make established channels more expensive or
difficult.
The
same principle applies beyond finance. BRICS cooperation increasingly reaches
agriculture, health, science, technology and other sectoral areas. India’s 2026
chairship helped institutionalise new cooperation tracks, including initiatives
involving agro-ecology, digital agriculture, health and scientific
collaboration. The declaration also records cooperation across science and
technology, including work through multiple thematic groups and emerging areas
such as quantum technologies.
These
initiatives are less dramatic than talk of a BRICS currency. They may
ultimately be more revealing.
BRICS's future strength will not be measured by the number of declarations calling for multipolarity. It will be measured by whether companies, researchers, financial institutions, farmers, technology organisations and governments can actually use the mechanisms created in its name.
From
Political Weight to Practical Power
This
is where New Delhi’s emphasis on implementation becomes important.
An
expanded organisation can easily become a summit machine: leaders meet,
communiqués are negotiated, photographs are taken, and another presidency
begins. The challenge is to create enough continuity between summits for
cooperation to build institutional memory.
India
sought to steer BRICS in that direction through the scale of its chairship
programme and sector-specific cooperation. The declaration outlines work in
science and technology, digital systems, cybersecurity, sustainable
development, tax cooperation and other fields. It also emphasises the need for
an international system that better reflects the economic weight and priorities
of emerging and developing economies.
China
used the summit to advance its vision of a more economically integrated
“Greater BRICS.” On the closing day, President Xi Jinping proposed deeper
cooperation in areas such as trade and artificial intelligence, including a
BRICS AI Open Source Zone and a special economic zone partnership. China also
plans to host a BRICS services-trade forum in 2027.
These
proposals also reveal one of BRICS’ central tensions.
China
has the economic scale to shape many of the mechanisms that BRICS may develop.
Russia has strong political incentives to accelerate alternatives to
Western-dominated institutions. India supports a more multipolar order but does
not want that objective to become synonymous with Chinese economic primacy or
permanent confrontation with the West.
The
three countries can therefore use the same language—multipolarity, Global
South, institutional reform- while attaching somewhat different strategic
meanings to it.
India’s
challenge is to preserve the areas of overlap without allowing those
differences to paralyse the institution.
The
Modi–Xi meeting on the sidelines of the summit illustrated the complexity. Both
leaders welcomed recent progress in bilateral relations and discussed business
links, mobility, market access, structural trade imbalances and supply-chain
concerns. Modi also stressed that peace and tranquillity along the border
remain essential to further developing relations.
This
is BRICS in miniature. India and China can cooperate on reforming global
institutions while competing economically and managing a difficult boundary
relationship. India can maintain an important strategic relationship with
Russia while deepening partnerships with Washington and Europe. The UAE can
participate alongside Iran without adopting Tehran’s geopolitical confrontation
with the United States.
BRICS
works not because these differences have disappeared, but because members have
so far concluded that cooperation in selected areas remains valuable despite
them.
The
Paradox of Expansion
That
leads to the central problem New Delhi could not solve in two days.
BRICS's expansion has strengthened its claim to represent a significant part
of the non-Western and developing world. It has broadened the grouping
geographically and expanded the range of political and economic interests at
the table.
But
every new member also complicates consensus.
An
institution composed of countries with diverse security partnerships,
development models, regional rivalries and foreign-policy priorities cannot
move with the cohesion of a military alliance or an integrated economic union.
Nor should BRICS be judged as though that were necessarily its objective.
Its
real test is different: can a deliberately diverse organisation identify enough
overlapping interests to produce useful cooperation without demanding strategic
alignment from its members?
New
Delhi suggests that the answer is still yes—but with qualifications.
Adopting a declaration on major international questions shows that consensus
remains possible. The proliferation of sectoral initiatives suggests that BRICS
is gaining greater institutional depth. India’s ability to host leaders with
sharply different positions while maintaining a practical agenda demonstrates
the forum’s diplomatic utility.
But
none of this guarantees delivery.
Working
groups can proliferate without delivering results. Payment mechanisms can
remain proposals. Technology initiatives can become arenas for competition
rather than cooperation. An organisation that expands faster than its
decision-making architecture can eventually find that it has purchased political weight at the cost of effectiveness.
This
is why the next phase matters more than the summit itself.
Conclusion
— The Test Begins After New Delhi
The
most important result of BRICS 2026 may be that New Delhi resisted the
temptation to define the organisation through a single geopolitical
confrontation.
BRICS
did not emerge from the summit as an anti-Western alliance. Nor did it become
an integrated economic bloc. It remains something less tidy and, in some
respects, more interesting: a platform where major emerging powers and
developing countries seek greater influence without necessarily sharing the
same strategic destination.
For
India, that ambiguity has value.
A
BRICS dominated by confrontation with the West would restrict Indian choices. A
BRICS incapable of practical cooperation would offer little beyond symbolism.
India’s preferred space lies between those outcomes, an institution strong
enough to broaden global representation, create additional economic and
technological options, and give the Global South greater influence, but
flexible enough to let members retain independent foreign policies.
New
Delhi moved the organisation somewhat further in that direction.
It
demonstrated that an enlarged BRICS can still achieve consensus during serious
international tensions. It reinforced calls for global governance reform. It
broadened practical cooperation across economic, technological and
developmental fields. It also showed how difficult the next stage will be: as
the organisation’s reach grows, it must reconcile more diverse interests.
The
final judgment on the New Delhi Summit will therefore not be found in the
declaration alone.
It
will be found in implementation: whether financial mechanisms become usable,
whether industrial and technology cooperation produces measurable outcomes,
whether development initiatives survive changes in national priorities, and
whether BRICS can maintain consensus when the next geopolitical crisis divides
its members more sharply than the last.
For
two decades, BRICS has proved that it can survive.
Expansion
has proved that it can grow.
New
Delhi posed the harder question: can a bigger BRICS become a more useful BRICS?
The
summit did not provide a final answer. But it made clear that this is not enlargement alone; it is now the test that will determine the institution’s relevance in the emerging global order.
ABOUT
THE AUTHOR
Mitin
Sheth (Shanilohit) is an Indian author, geopolitical analyst and strategic book
reviewer who has been associated with the Janmabhoomi Group of Newspapers as a
freelance Senior Columnist for more than 25 years. He has written extensively
on international affairs, geopolitics and strategic issues. His work also
focuses on defence and military affairs, emerging technologies, global
security, and India’s evolving role in the international order.
SELECTED REFERENCES
Prime Minister of India — BRICS New Delhi Declaration: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability, September 12, 2026.
Press Information Bureau, Government of India — Opening Remarks by the Prime Minister during the 18th BRICS Summit, September 12, 2026.
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2309468&lang=1®=3&
Press Information Bureau, Government of India — Prime Minister’s Address at the BRICS Business Forum 2026, September 11, 2026.
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2309275&lang=1®=3&
Reuters — BRICS Adopts Joint Declaration, Urges “Maximum Restraint” in Mideast, September 12, 2026.
Reuters — Iran and UAE Back Joint BRICS Statement Urging Restraint in War, September 12, 2026.
Reuters — India’s Modi and China’s Xi Push Business Links, Border Peace as Ties Revive, September 12, 2026.
DISCLAIMER
This article is an independent
analysis based on publicly available information, official statements, credible
media reports, and open-source research. It is intended for informational and
analytical purposes only. The views and interpretations expressed are those of
the author. While I have made every effort to ensure factual accuracy,
developments may change as new information becomes available.
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