India built Chabahar to bypass Pakistan and open a route towards
Afghanistan and Central Asia. Today, U.S. sanctions and the conflict
surrounding Iran are testing whether New Delhi can protect that gateway without
being forced to choose between Washington and Tehran.
By Mitin Rajkuumar Sheth (Shanilohit)
Originally Published: July 15, 2026 |
Revised: October 4, 2026
Estimated Reading Time: 10–12 Minutes
Executive
Summary
Chabahar Port has always meant more to India
than an overseas infrastructure project. Situated on Iran’s southeastern coast,
it offers India a potential route to Afghanistan and Central Asia without
relying on transit through Pakistan. That geographical advantage has made
Chabahar an important part of India’s broader Eurasian strategy and prompted
India Ports Global Limited to sign a ten-year agreement in May 2024 to operate
the Shahid Beheshti Terminal.
The strategic logic behind Chabahar remains
strong, but the political environment around it has become far more difficult.
The conditional U.S. sanctions waiver that protected Indian involvement expired
on April 26, 2026, leaving New Delhi to navigate a complex situation involving
Washington, Tehran and its long-term connectivity interests. India has
continued discussions with the concerned parties rather than simply abandoning
the project, but the uncertainty surrounding sanctions now affects both the port's
commercial and strategic future.
For India, this is no longer merely a question
of maintaining an investment in Iran. It tests whether New Delhi can
protect an important national interest while sustaining strong relations with
the United States and continuing its engagement with Tehran. In my view, this
is where Chabahar becomes a real test of strategic autonomy. Strategic autonomy
is meaningful only when India can preserve room for independent decision-making
under precisely this kind of geopolitical pressure.
Introduction
Geography has given India enormous advantages,
but it has also constrained its westward connectivity. Pakistan lies between
India and Afghanistan, while the landlocked countries of Central Asia lie
beyond. For decades, New Delhi has therefore faced a basic strategic problem:
how can India secure reliable access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without
relying on Pakistan for transit?
Chabahar offered an answer. Situated on Iran’s
Gulf of Oman coast, the port provided India with a maritime gateway into Iran
and, from there, towards Afghanistan, Central Asia and the wider Eurasian
region. This is why Chabahar should never be judged merely by the number of
ships entering its harbour or the amount of cargo handled at its terminal. Its
deeper value lies in the strategic access it can provide India.
That access is now under pressure. The expiry
of the U.S. sanctions waiver in April 2026 coincided with a broader
confrontation over Iran, which had already made trade, finance, shipping and
investment more difficult. India therefore faces a challenge very different
from the one it faced when it conceived the Chabahar project. The question
today is not whether India needs Chabahar. The question is whether India can
keep Chabahar's strategic purpose alive while navigating competing
pressures from Washington and Tehran.
I believe this question goes well beyond one
port. India increasingly describes itself as an independent power capable of
maintaining partnerships with countries that may be rivals. Chabahar tests that
claim because it forces India to balance its growing strategic partnership with
the United States against geographical and economic interests that require
continued engagement with Iran.
Why Chabahar Matters to
India
Chabahar matters because India cannot rely on Pakistan for direct access to Afghanistan and Central
Asia. The Iranian route offers New Delhi an alternative maritime entry point to
a region where India’s economic and political interests have steadily grown. It
can also complement the International North-South Transport Corridor and
provide India with another link to the larger Eurasian economic space.
This explains why successive Indian governments
remained interested in Chabahar even when progress was slow, and sanctions
repeatedly complicated the project. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has
linked Iran’s geographical position to India’s connectivity to Central Asia,
Afghanistan and Eurasia, while Central Asian governments have also expressed
interest in greater use of Chabahar. At the fourth India–Central Asia Dialogue
in June 2025, ministers welcomed greater use of the Shahid Beheshti Terminal
for trade between Central Asia, India and other markets.
This wider regional interest is important
because Chabahar becomes much more valuable when it is not viewed only as an
India–Iran project. If Central Asian countries can use it to reach Indian and
maritime markets, the port can gradually develop into a regional connectivity
hub. For India, that would strengthen commercial links while also increasing
its strategic presence in a region where geography has traditionally limited
Indian influence.
The objective, therefore, should not be to
preserve Chabahar merely because India has already invested in it. India should
preserve it because the geographical problem that originally made the port
necessary remains. Pakistan still blocks the most direct land route to
Afghanistan and Central Asia, and India still needs alternative corridors if it
wants a meaningful economic presence in Eurasia.
The Ten-Year Agreement
Raised India’s Stakes
India’s commitment became more concrete on May
13, 2024, when India Ports Global Limited and Iran’s Ports and Maritime
Organisation signed a ten-year agreement for the Shahid Beheshti Terminal.
Until then, Chabahar had progressed through years of temporary arrangements,
shifting sanctions and political uncertainty. The longer agreement suggested
that both governments wanted to give the project a more stable foundation.
However, deeper involvement also brought
greater exposure. Once India became more closely connected to the terminal's
operations, sanctions against Iran could no longer be treated as a distant
political issue. Restrictions on banking, shipping, insurance or commercial
transactions could directly affect whether Indian participation remained
practical.
There is irony in this situation. India turned
to Chabahar to reduce one geopolitical vulnerability: dependence on Pakistan
for access to the West. Yet the alternative route runs through Iran, a country
that has remained at the centre of another long-running geopolitical
confrontation. India may have found an alternative to one geographical
constraint only to encounter another political one.
This does not mean the original strategy was
mistaken. It means India must consider connectivity in broader strategic terms.
A corridor is valuable only if it remains usable when relations with other
countries deteriorate. Building infrastructure is therefore only the first
stage. Protecting the political, commercial and financial conditions required
to use that infrastructure is equally important.
The Expiry of the U.S.
Waiver Changed the Situation
The most important change came on April 26,
2026, when the conditional U.S. sanctions waiver covering India’s Chabahar
activities expired. Before that deadline, India had been discussing the issue
with both Washington and Tehran and examining ways to protect its interests
while reducing sanctions exposure. Reports at the time indicated that one
possible arrangement involved temporary local management while preserving
India’s ability to return more fully if sanctions conditions changed.
After the waiver expired, the Ministry of
External Affairs confirmed that the matter remained under discussion with both
Iran and the United States and acknowledged that the wider regional conflict
had complicated the situation. This matters because it shows India did not treat April 26 as the end of Chabahar. New Delhi continued to
search for a workable way forward while trying to avoid unnecessary
confrontation with Washington.
In my view, India is right to proceed
cautiously. Chabahar is too important to abandon simply because the
geopolitical environment has become difficult, but it would also be unwise to
expose Indian companies and financial institutions to sanctions without
considering the consequences. The objective should be to protect India’s
long-term position while retaining enough flexibility to adjust the operating
arrangement as circumstances change.
This is where strategic patience is as
important as strategic ambition. India need not prove its independence by
deliberately confronting the United States, nor must it prove its partnership
with Washington by giving up every interest tied to Iran. A mature foreign
policy should manage disagreement without turning every difference
into a crisis.
A Port Can Remain Open and Still Lose Strategic Value
One of the most important lessons from Chabahar
is that a port need not be physically damaged to lose strategic value. A modern
trade corridor depends on far more than berths, cranes and warehouses. Ships
must be willing to call at the port, insurers must cover them, banks must
process transactions, freight companies must move cargo inland, and businesses
must believe the route will remain commercially predictable.
Sanctions can affect every part of that system.
Even when a particular activity is technically permitted, companies may decide
that dealing with Iran poses too much regulatory or financial risk. Banks may
avoid transactions, insurers may demand higher premiums, and shipping companies
may opt for easier routes. The result can be a chilling effect on commerce that
weakens a corridor without formally closing it.
For India, this is the real danger. Chabahar
can remain visible on the map, the terminal can stand, and Indian officials can
continue describing it as strategically important, but none of that will matter
if cargo does not move through it. The project's success must therefore be
measured not only by diplomatic agreements but by actual commercial use.
India consequently needs a strategy that
protects both the political and economic foundations of Chabahar. Diplomatic
engagement with Washington and Tehran is essential, but so are workable payment
arrangements, dependable shipping, insurance and regular cargo. A strategic
gateway that businesses cannot use with confidence eventually becomes a symbol
rather than an asset.
India Cannot Ignore
Washington or Geography
India’s relationship with the United States has
become too important to treat American concerns casually. Defence cooperation,
technology, intelligence, trade and the Indo-Pacific have created a broad
strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington. India therefore has no
interest in turning Chabahar into an ideological confrontation with the United
States.
At the same time, Washington and New Delhi view
Iran from different geographical perspectives. For the United States, Iran is
primarily associated with nuclear policy, sanctions, regional security, and Middle Eastern power politics. For India, those issues matter, but
Iran is also a neighbouring country that provides access to Afghanistan,
Central Asia and Eurasia.
American policy towards Iran can change with administrations, but India cannot change the geography of its
neighbourhood. Iran will remain important because of its location and the
routes that pass through it. India therefore needs to maintain a relationship
with Tehran without letting it become anti-American.
This balance is difficult, but it is not
impossible. New Delhi’s strongest argument is that Chabahar serves legitimate
connectivity and regional-development purposes. India should continue
explaining that its involvement in the port is based on access to Afghanistan
and Central Asia rather than on support for every aspect of Iranian foreign
policy. The clearer that distinction remains, the greater India’s diplomatic
room for manoeuvre.
Chabahar Should Become a
Wider Regional Project
India can strengthen its position further by
encouraging greater Central Asian involvement. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan all have an interest in better access
to maritime trade routes and the Indian market. The interest expressed at the
2025 India–Central Asia Dialogue provides a foundation for New Delhi to build
on.
If Chabahar develops into a route used by
several Central Asian economies, its identity changes. It becomes harder to
view the port simply as an Indian investment inside Iran because it begins
serving a broader regional purpose. This will not remove American sanctions or
eliminate geopolitical risk, but it can strengthen the case that the port
contributes to legitimate international trade and connectivity.
Greater regional participation would also solve
another problem. Infrastructure becomes strategically durable when many
countries have an interest in keeping it operational. India should therefore
focus not only on maintaining its own position at Chabahar but also on
attracting cargo and users from across Central Asia.
The port’s future will ultimately depend on
whether it becomes useful enough that regional governments and businesses want
to preserve it. Diplomatic importance alone cannot guarantee that outcome.
Chabahar needs commercial life as well as strategic meaning.
Chabahar and the INSTC
Must Provide Choices, Not New Dependence
Chabahar is often discussed alongside the
International North-South Transport Corridor, but they are not the same
project. The INSTC is a much larger multimodal network spanning sea, road, and rail connections through Iran and onward to Russia and the wider Eurasian
region. Chabahar can support this broader connectivity system while retaining
its particular importance for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
India should therefore avoid making any single
port or corridor indispensable. The stronger strategy is to develop several
routes that complement one another. Chabahar, the INSTC and other maritime and
continental connections should give India alternatives when political
conditions change.
This is another aspect of strategic autonomy
that receives too little attention. Independence in foreign policy is not
achieved solely through diplomatic declarations or defence capability. A
country also gains autonomy when it has multiple supply routes, multiple
trading partners and multiple ways of reaching important markets.
India’s long-term objective should therefore be
wider than saving Chabahar alone. The objective should be to build enough
connectivity options that no single country can easily close India’s road to
Eurasia.
Strategic Autonomy Is
Being Tested in Practice
The phrase “strategic autonomy” is often
invoked in discussions of Indian foreign policy, but Chabahar illustrates what
the concept means in practice. It does not require India to oppose Washington
whenever American policy diverges from Indian interests, nor does it require
New Delhi to support Tehran whenever Iran faces Western pressure. Strategic
autonomy means retaining the ability to make decisions based on India’s
long-term interests while managing relationships with several competing powers.
On Chabahar, those interests are relatively
clear. India needs better access to Afghanistan and Central Asia; it needs
multiple routes towards Eurasia; it has reasons to maintain a working
relationship with Iran; and it has powerful reasons to strengthen its strategic
partnership with the United States. A successful Indian foreign policy should
seek to preserve all these interests rather than allow one to automatically
destroy the others.
This is why I do not believe India should frame
Chabahar as a choice between America and Iran. Such a framing would accept the
strategic terms set by other countries rather than defining the issue according
to India’s own requirements. New Delhi should instead continue explaining why
Chabahar matters to India and why legitimate Indian connectivity should not be
conflated with the wider disputes between Washington and Tehran.
There may be periods when India has to reduce
its operational exposure, alter commercial arrangements or wait for a more
favourable political environment. Such adjustments should not automatically be
interpreted as abandonment. Foreign policy sometimes requires preserving a
strategic position quietly until circumstances improve.
The Real Test Is Whether
Cargo Continues to Move
Ultimately, the future of Chabahar should be
judged by a simple practical question: can India and its regional partners
continue using the route? Contracts, diplomatic statements, and political
symbolism matter, but the port's strategic purpose will be fulfilled only if
ships arrive, cargo moves, and businesses find the corridor commercially
useful.
India therefore needs to look beyond whether
its flag remains associated with a terminal. It should ask whether Indian
companies can use the route economically, whether Central Asian countries can
depend on it, whether shipping and insurance remain workable and whether goods
can move from the port into the wider regional transport network with
reasonable predictability.
These questions also carry a broader lesson for
India. As the Indian economy grows and its global footprint expands, more
Indian investments, infrastructure projects and supply chains will be exposed
to politically unstable regions. Protecting those interests cannot depend
primarily on military power. India will increasingly need diplomatic influence,
legal agreements, financial resilience, commercial partnerships and maritime
capability working in concert.
Chabahar is therefore an early example of a
challenge India will face more often in the future. Becoming a major power is
not simply about building assets abroad. It also requires the political and economic strength to protect its strategic purpose when
international conditions become difficult.
Conclusion: India Must
Keep Its Road to Eurasia Open
Chabahar represents one of India’s clearest
attempts to turn geography from a limitation into a strategic opportunity. It
provides a possible route towards Afghanistan and Central Asia without
dependence on Pakistan, supports India’s wider Eurasian ambitions and gives New
Delhi a presence in a region that will remain important to Indian trade and
foreign policy.
The expiry of the U.S. sanctions waiver has
made the situation more difficult, but it has not altered the project’s
geographical logic. India should neither exaggerate American hostility towards
Chabahar nor underestimate the consequences of sanctions. There is a major
difference between arguing that the U.S.–Iran confrontation can damage India’s
interests and claiming that Washington is deliberately targeting India through
Chabahar. The first is a legitimate strategic concern; the second would require
evidence that is not presently available.
India’s response should therefore remain
measured yet firm. New Delhi should continue discussions with Washington,
preserve its long-term engagement with Tehran, encourage greater Central Asian
participation, and develop other routes that complement Chabahar. If
operational arrangements have to change temporarily due to sanctions, India
should protect its ability to return when conditions allow, rather than
surrender the larger strategic objective.
Most importantly, India should resist being
forced into an artificial choice between important relationships. Strategic
autonomy does not mean remaining neutral between competing powers. It means
maintaining sufficient political, economic and diplomatic freedom to pursue
Indian interests, even when those interests do not perfectly align with another
country's preferences.
Chabahar is now testing that very ability. The
port was conceived because India needed another way to reach Afghanistan,
Central Asia and the wider Eurasian region. That need has not disappeared, even
as the international environment has become more dangerous.
Chabahar was created to give India another road to
the world. Keeping that road open may now be as important as building it.
About the Author
Mitin Rajkuumar Sheth (Shanilohit) is an Indian
author, geopolitical analyst and strategic book reviewer who has been
associated with the Janmabhoomi Group of Newspapers as a freelance Senior
Columnist for more than 25 years. He has written extensively on international
affairs, geopolitics and strategic issues. His work also focuses on defence and
military affairs, emerging technologies, global security, and India’s evolving
role in the international order.
Selected References
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India — Annual Report 2024.
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India — Joint Press Statement by External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India — Fourth India–Central Asia Dialogue, June 6, 2025.
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India — statements concerning Chabahar and India's discussions with the United
States and Iran, 2026.
Editorial Transparency
& Full Disclosure
This is an independently researched and
authored analysis. Advanced digital tools and AI were used solely for
supplementary support tasks, including research cross-referencing, translation
verification, image generation, and grammatical refinement. The core analytical
insights, strategic conclusions, and creative direction are entirely the
author’s own.
Copyright Notice
© 2026 Mitin Rajkuumar Sheth (Shanilohit). All
Rights Reserved.
No part of this article may be reproduced,
republished or distributed in substantial form without prior written permission
from the author, except for brief quotations with proper attribution and a link
to the original article.
No comments:
Post a Comment