Iran-U.S. Cognitive Warfare:

How PSYOPS, AI and Disinformation Shape Modern Conflict

Modern wars are fought not only for territory, but for attention, belief and the ability to shape an adversary’s decisions.

By Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit)
Originally Published: July 22, 2026 | Revised: August 15, 2026
Estimated Reading Time: 10–11 minutes

Introduction

Modern conflict is fought not only over territory, airspace and sea lanes, but also over what societies believe to be true. In the long confrontation between Iran and the United States, cyber operations, strategic messaging, propaganda, disinformation and digital influence have increasingly become instruments of state power. Their purpose is not always to persuade an opponent; sometimes it is enough to create doubt, amplify division, weaken confidence or make decision-makers uncertain about what is real.

Artificial intelligence has accelerated this contest. Narratives can now be produced, translated and distributed at extraordinary speed, while synthetic images, audio and video make authentic information increasingly difficult to distinguish from manipulation. The result is a cognitive battlefield in which influencing an adversary’s decisions may sometimes matter almost as much as destroying its military assets.

Executive Summary

The Iran-U.S. confrontation demonstrates how information has become an operational domain alongside conventional military and cyber power. Iran has developed cyber-enabled influence networks capable of targeting foreign audiences, exploiting political divisions and challenging Western narratives. The United States, meanwhile, combines intelligence, strategic communication, cyber capabilities, sanctions and military signalling in an effort to influence Iranian calculations and reassure its allies.

Artificial intelligence makes these operations faster and cheaper, but it also introduces a greater danger: miscalculation. The most serious risk of cognitive warfare may therefore not be propaganda that everyone believes, but uncertainty itself—when governments, markets or populations make consequential decisions without knowing which information they can trust.

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From the Battlefield to the Human Mind

Psychological warfare is hardly new. Military commanders have used deception, rumours, intimidation and manipulated information for centuries, and Sun Tzu’s famous observation that warfare rests heavily upon deception long predates the digital world. What has changed is the scale, speed and reach of psychological influence. A leaflet once had to be dropped from an aircraft, while radio propaganda depended upon transmitters and geographical reach. Today, a misleading narrative can cross continents in seconds, and an unverified claim can become a political controversy before intelligence agencies have even determined whether the underlying event occurred.

AI adds another layer to this transformation. Text, images, voices and increasingly convincing video can be generated rapidly and cheaply, allowing information campaigns to operate on a scale that previous generations could scarcely have imagined. The psychological battlefield is therefore no longer confined to soldiers or political leaders. Citizens, investors, journalists, diplomats and entire societies can become targets, which makes cognitive warfare both more powerful and considerably more difficult to contain.

Iran’s Evolution From Revolutionary Messaging to Digital Influence

Iran entered the information contest long before artificial intelligence appeared. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Tehran built a political identity around resistance to American influence and opposition to what it portrayed as Western domination of the Middle East. That narrative served domestic as well as international purposes: inside Iran, it helped legitimise the revolutionary state, while across the region it supported Tehran’s effort to present itself as a defender of resistance against Israel and Western power.

Over time, however, Iranian information operations became considerably more sophisticated. State media remained important, but social media, covert personas, cyber operations and influence networks created new ways to reach foreign audiences. U.S. intelligence agencies, the FBI and CISA publicly concluded during the 2024 American presidential election that Iranian actors sought to exploit social tensions, sow discord and undermine confidence in democratic institutions. Iranian cyber actors also targeted political campaign material. This represented an important evolution: the objective was no longer simply to broadcast Iran’s interpretation of events, but also to influence the political and informational environment in which an adversary makes decisions.

Reflexive Control: A Useful Analogy, Not an Iranian Doctrine

Some Iranian influence techniques resemble what strategic literature describes as reflexive control—the attempt to provide an adversary with carefully shaped information that encourages decisions favourable to the initiator. The concept is most strongly associated with Soviet and Russian strategic thought, so it would be inaccurate to describe reflexive control automatically as formal Iranian doctrine. Nevertheless, the underlying principle provides a useful way of understanding aspects of contemporary information warfare.

An adversary does not always need to be defeated militarily if its calculations can be altered beforehand. A government that overestimates an opponent’s capabilities may hesitate; a population convinced that a war cannot be won may oppose continued military action; an ally uncertain about American commitment may seek accommodation elsewhere; and financial markets convinced that the Strait of Hormuz is about to close may react before a single tanker is stopped. Information acquires strategic power when it begins to shape behaviour rather than merely opinion.

The Global Audience Matters

Iranian messaging is not aimed only at Washington. It also addresses audiences across the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Global South. Themes involving sanctions, Palestinian suffering, Western military intervention and civilian casualties can resonate with audiences already sceptical of aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Iranian state media and aligned information networks can use those grievances to present Tehran’s confrontation with Washington as part of a larger struggle against Western dominance.

Influence, however, should not be confused with persuasion. Audiences may agree with criticism of American policy without supporting Iran, while others may distrust both governments. That distinction matters because cognitive warfare does not always succeed by converting people to one side. Sometimes weakening confidence in every competing narrative is sufficient. When audiences become unsure whom to believe, confusion itself can acquire strategic value.

Cyber Operations and the Psychology of Vulnerability

Cyber warfare has an unusual psychological characteristic: its physical effects can sometimes be limited while its psychological consequences are substantial. A compromised military network creates uncertainty about what else may have been penetrated; an attack on infrastructure can make citizens question whether essential services are secure; and a successful intrusion into a political organisation can create distrust long after the immediate breach has been contained.

Iran has demonstrated meaningful cyber capabilities. Microsoft documented Iranian state-aligned actors combining cyberattacks with online influence operations, particularly during the Israel-Hamas conflict. Some operations exaggerated or fabricated the scale of supposed cyber successes, illustrating how the perception of disruption could itself become part of the operation. This distinction is central to modern cognitive warfare: a cyber operation can have two targets—the computer system itself and the human mind observing what has happened to it.

AI Changes the Economics of Influence

Artificial intelligence does not invent propaganda; it changes its economics. Influence campaigns once required substantial teams to produce material in different languages and formats. Generative AI can now assist with writing, translation, images and synthetic media at far greater speed and substantially lower cost. This lowers the barrier to entry for governments, political organisations and covert influence networks seeking to flood the information environment.

There is already documented evidence of Iranian-linked actors experimenting with such tools. In August 2024, OpenAI disrupted accounts linked to an Iranian influence operation known as Storm-2035 that had used ChatGPT to generate content concerning subjects including the U.S. presidential campaign. Importantly, the investigation found no indication that the operation achieved meaningful audience engagement. That qualification is essential: using sophisticated AI does not automatically make an influence campaign effective. Technology can increase volume, but it cannot guarantee credibility or persuasion.

Microsoft's Digital Defense Report has likewise documented the growing use of AI by state-linked actors in influence activity. The larger danger lies partly in scale. Even mediocre propaganda becomes more difficult to identify and counter when enormous quantities of content can be generated, modified, translated and distributed quickly.

Deepfakes and the Collapse of Certainty

Deepfakes create a different and potentially more dangerous problem. The obvious risk is that people believe something false, but there is an equally serious second-order danger: people may stop believing authentic evidence. Once societies know that convincing audio and video can be fabricated, genuine recordings can also be dismissed as synthetic. The result is a credibility vacuum in which neither truth nor falsehood is immediately accepted.

During a military crisis, such uncertainty can be dangerous. An apparently authentic recording of a leader ordering mobilisation, a fabricated announcement concerning the Strait of Hormuz, a false video suggesting that a military base has been destroyed, or synthetic audio appearing to reveal secret negotiations could all produce consequences before verification arrives. Even if the deception survives for only an hour, markets can move, populations can panic and military decisions can be taken during that hour. Cognitive warfare therefore increasingly operates against time: the faster the information environment becomes, the less time decision-makers have to establish what is genuine.

Intelligence, Deception and Kinetic Warfare

The Israeli-Iranian confrontation illustrates how intelligence, deception and military action can overlap without necessarily being the same thing. Israel's Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 demonstrated the importance of intelligence preparation and surprise in attacks against Iranian military and nuclear-related targets. Yet an analytical distinction remains necessary: not every successful intelligence operation should automatically be classified as PSYOPS.

Espionage seeks information; cyber operations penetrate or disrupt systems; military deception attempts to mislead opposing commanders; psychological operations seek to influence perceptions, attitudes or behaviour. Modern operations can combine all four, but treating them as identical produces exaggerated conclusions. Their real significance lies in integration. An intelligence penetration can create psychological uncertainty, a cyberattack can make commanders distrust their communications, a deceptive military signal can cause forces to move in the wrong direction, and a subsequent information campaign can magnify the perceived consequences of a physical strike.

Washington’s Information Advantage and Its Limits

The United States possesses enormous advantages in global communication. American officials operate within an international media environment capable of transmitting Washington’s position around the world almost instantly, while U.S. military deployments communicate messages even without formal statements. An aircraft carrier moving into a region, additional air-defence assets being deployed or strategic bombers conducting exercises can all signal capability and political intent. Such signalling may deter an adversary without requiring actual combat.

Information power, however, has limits. Repeated threats that are not followed by action can weaken credibility, exaggerated claims can damage trust, and attempts to dominate a narrative can fail when independent evidence contradicts official messaging. Credibility is therefore a strategic asset that governments can spend. Once depleted, it can be extremely difficult to rebuild. That applies to Washington as much as it does to Tehran.

Hormuz: When Perception Moves Markets

Few places illustrate the relationship between military risk, perception and economics better than the Strait of Hormuz. It is one of the world's most important energy chokepoints, and threats to shipping can therefore affect expectations long before the full physical consequences of disruption become clear. In the current 2026 confrontation, renewed threats and uncertainty surrounding Hormuz have again influenced oil-market sentiment. On August 14, oil prices rose amid renewed fears surrounding disruption through the Strait.

Not every market movement is PSYOPS, and that distinction must be maintained. Nevertheless, strategic signalling can amplify uncertainty already created by military developments. Traders do not necessarily wait for missiles to fall before adjusting prices; insurers do not wait for a tanker to sink before reassessing risk. When enough economic actors believe escalation may occur, perception itself begins to influence economic reality.

Disinformation Works Best Where Division Already Exists

Foreign influence campaigns rarely create social divisions from nothing. They exploit divisions that already exist. Political polarisation, racial tension, distrust of government, economic anxiety and anger over foreign wars provide openings that outside actors can amplify. This is one reason technologically advanced democratic societies can remain vulnerable to relatively inexpensive information operations.

Iranian-linked operations surrounding the 2024 U.S. election demonstrated attempts to exploit political controversy through covert personas, cyber activity and material designed for American audiences. The broader lesson extends well beyond Iran. Societies with strong institutions, trusted journalism and citizens capable of evaluating information sources are more difficult to manipulate. Cognitive defence is therefore not simply a military or intelligence responsibility; it is also a question of social and democratic resilience.

The Human Target

Technology can make psychological warfare appear abstract, but ultimately the target remains human: a soldier wondering whether his commander understands the battlefield, a citizen deciding whether to trust the government, a diplomat questioning whether an ally will honour a commitment, an investor deciding whether to move capital, a voter considering whether political institutions remain legitimate, or a national leader deciding whether intelligence justifies military escalation.

Every one of these decisions can be influenced by information. This is why the cognitive domain matters. Military power can destroy an adversary's equipment, but information can influence whether that adversary chooses to fight, retreat, negotiate or escalate before the physical battle has even begun.

The Greatest Danger Is Miscalculation

Much discussion of PSYOPS focuses on successful manipulation, but the greater danger may be something less deliberate: miscalculation. A government may mistake propaganda for genuine intent; a military commander may interpret a deceptive signal as preparation for attack; an AI-generated image may circulate during a crisis before analysts establish that it is false; or political leaders facing public pressure may feel compelled to respond to an event that has been exaggerated or misunderstood.

The faster the information environment becomes, the greater this danger grows. Nuclear-armed or heavily armed states cannot afford decisions based on viral content. Verification therefore becomes a strategic capability in its own right. Governments need intelligence systems capable not merely of collecting more information, but of distinguishing reliable information from manipulation quickly enough to support decisions before a crisis outruns the facts.

Cognitive Warfare Will Outlive the Present Conflict

The techniques visible in the Iran-U.S. confrontation will not disappear when the present crisis eventually subsides. AI will improve, synthetic media will become more convincing, automated accounts will become harder to distinguish from real users, and translation systems will allow influence campaigns to address local audiences with increasing linguistic and cultural sophistication. Cyber intrusions will also be accompanied more frequently by information operations designed to magnify their psychological effect.

Governments, technology companies and civil society will improve detection at the same time. This creates an arms race not merely between offensive and defensive technology, but between fabrication and verification. The countries best prepared for future information warfare may therefore not be those capable of producing the largest volume of propaganda; they may be those whose institutions and societies remain capable of determining what to believe.

What India Should Learn From the Cognitive Battlefield

There is an important lesson here for India. As one of the world's largest digital societies, with a vast multilingual information environment and its own complex strategic competition, India cannot assume that future conflict will remain confined to the physical battlefield. False casualty reports, fabricated military announcements, synthetic speeches, communal disinformation, manipulated battlefield imagery and financial rumours could all be used to create confusion during a crisis.

India's response cannot rely solely on censorship or reactive fact-checking. It requires faster official communication, deepfake detection, cyber resilience, trusted institutional channels and close coordination between national-security agencies and civilian information systems. Most importantly, official credibility must be protected. During a crisis, citizens must know where verified information can be found. That trust cannot suddenly be manufactured after hostilities begin; it has to be built beforehand.

Conclusion: The Invisible Battlefield of Belief

The Iran-U.S. confrontation demonstrates that modern power is exercised not only through missiles, aircraft, sanctions and naval deployments, but also through information. Iran has developed cyber-enabled influence capabilities designed to exploit political and social vulnerabilities, while the United States possesses formidable intelligence, communications and strategic-signalling capabilities of its own. Artificial intelligence now increases the speed and scale at which both genuine information and manipulation can travel.

Yet the deepest lesson of cognitive warfare is not that propaganda has become all-powerful. It is that trust has become strategically valuable. A military that cannot trust its communications becomes weaker; a population that cannot trust institutions becomes easier to divide; a market that cannot distinguish threat from bluff becomes volatile; and a government that cannot distinguish intelligence from manipulation risks making catastrophic decisions.

The battlefield of the future will still contain ships, missiles, drones and soldiers. But before many of those weapons are used, another battle will already be under way, a battle over what people see, what they fear, what governments believe and ultimately what societies accept as true.

Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit)
Senior Columnist, Janmabhoomi Group of Newspapers | Author | Geopolitical Analyst | Strategic Book Reviewer

Selected References

ODNI, FBI & CISA — “Joint Statement on Iranian Election Influence Efforts,” August 19, 2024

Official U.S. assessment concerning Iranian attempts to exploit societal tensions, influence U.S. elections and conduct cyber activity against political campaigns.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence — “Iran Accelerates Cyber Ops Against Israel,” February 6, 2024

Analysis of Iranian cyber-enabled influence operations and the combination of cyber activity with online narrative campaigns.

OpenAI — “Disrupting a Covert Iranian Influence Operation,” August 16, 2024

Documents Storm-2035's use of generative AI for influence content while importantly finding no evidence of meaningful audience engagement.

Microsoft — Digital Defense Report 2024

Provides wider analysis of state-linked cyber and AI-enabled influence activity.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence — “Iran Targeting 2024 U.S. Election,” August 8, 2024
Research documenting Iranian-linked covert personas, cyber activity and influence efforts directed at American political audiences.

Disclaimer

This article examines psychological operations, cyber-enabled influence, disinformation and strategic communication for analytical and educational purposes. Attribution in the information domain is often complex, and the article distinguishes documented activity from analytical interpretation wherever possible. It does not endorse information manipulation, cyberattacks or military action by any state or non-state actor.

“Independently authored work. AI tools were used only for supportive tasks (research, translation, editing, image generation, and grammatical/punctuation correction). Final content and creative direction are the author’s own.”

Copyright Notice

Copyright © 2026 Mitin Sheth (Shanilohit). All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the author, except for brief quotations permitted under applicable copyright law.