The New Sentinel: Is Israel Becoming a Security Provider in the Middle East?

How the Israel–UAE Defence Partnership, Saudi Arabia’s Quiet Intelligence Contacts and Iran’s Regional Challenge Are Reshaping Gulf Security

By Mitin Rajkuumar Sheth (Shanilohit)

Originally Published: May 4, 2026 | Revised: October 8, 2026

Estimated Reading Time: 12–14 Minutes

Executive Summary

The Middle East is undergoing a significant shift in its security relationships. Israel, which spent decades defending itself against hostile neighbours, is gradually emerging as a security partner for some Arab countries. Since the Abraham Accords of 2020, the United Arab Emirates has expanded its defence and intelligence cooperation with Israel. More recently, reports that Saudi Arabia has sought Israeli intelligence assistance through American military channels suggest that limited security cooperation may be possible even without formal diplomatic relations.

The threats posed by Iran, its regional partners and the Houthi movement in Yemen have prompted governments to revisit old political divisions. Israel's experience in missile defence, intelligence gathering, cybersecurity and military technology makes it a valuable partner. However, closer cooperation also carries risks. Iran may view Israel's expanding presence in Gulf security as a threat, while the unresolved Palestinian question continues to shape relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The central question is whether Israel can become a reliable regional security provider without creating another source of confrontation. The answer will depend on how Israel, the Gulf states and the United States manage their shared interests while preventing military cooperation from fueling a wider regional conflict.

Introduction: A Changing Middle East

For much of its modern history, Israel was regarded by many Arab governments as an adversary rather than a potential security partner. They recognised its military capabilities, but political hostility prevented open cooperation. This situation began to change as regional governments faced new threats and reconsidered their security priorities.

The Abraham Accords of September 2020 marked an important turning point. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain established formal diplomatic relations with Israel, opening opportunities for cooperation in trade, technology, investment and security. What began as a diplomatic breakthrough gradually evolved into a more strategically important relationship.

The change became particularly evident during the regional confrontations involving Iran in 2026. Israeli defence technology and intelligence capabilities gained prominence in discussions about Gulf security. Reports of Israeli air-defence equipment and personnel operating in the UAE suggested that cooperation had moved beyond diplomatic meetings and commercial agreements.

For me, this development matters because it reflects a broader shift in Middle Eastern politics. Countries that once judged their relationships primarily by political and ideological differences are increasingly making decisions based on immediate security needs. Old disputes have not disappeared, but governments are finding practical reasons to cooperate despite those disagreements.

Israel's emerging role should therefore be understood as part of a shifting regional security system, not as evidence that the Middle East has suddenly accepted Israeli leadership.

From the Abraham Accords to Defence Cooperation

The Israel–UAE relationship offers the clearest example of this transformation. Both countries share strong economic interests, technological ambitions and concerns about regional instability. Their cooperation has expanded to include defence industries, surveillance systems and intelligence sharing.

An October 2026 analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that Israeli defence exports to Abraham Accords countries, particularly the UAE, had risen sharply since 2021. It also noted growing defence-industrial cooperation between Israel and the UAE. According to the analysis, Israel reportedly deployed an Iron Dome battery and other defensive equipment to the UAE during the March–April 2026 confrontation with Iran.

These developments matter because the UAE faces threats that conventional military strength alone cannot eliminate. Ballistic missiles, drones and cyberattacks can threaten airports, ports, energy installations and commercial centres. Even a limited attack can cause serious economic damage by disrupting essential infrastructure.

Israel has spent years developing systems to detect and intercept airborne threats. This experience is valuable to countries seeking better protection against missiles and drones. However, no single defence system can stop every threat. For example, Iron Dome is designed primarily to counter specific categories of short-range airborne threats. Effective protection requires multiple systems working together, supported by reliable intelligence and early warning.

The UAE has also made clear that it retains sovereignty over its security decisions. In September 2026, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that Emirati and Israeli authorities maintained direct communication and exchanged relevant intelligence as needed. However, the UAE has rejected certain reports about undisclosed political and military arrangements.

This distinction is important. Israel is becoming a significant security partner, but it is not the UAE's sole protector. Abu Dhabi continues to maintain defence relationships with the United States and other international partners.

In my assessment, Israel's greatest contribution may not be the number of weapons it supplies. Its real value could lie in improving how quickly threats are detected, understood and countered. In modern warfare, accurate intelligence a few minutes early can sometimes be more valuable than another expensive weapons system.

Saudi Arabia and Israel: Cooperation Without Diplomatic Recognition?

An equally important development concerns Saudi Arabia, which has not established formal diplomatic relations with Israel. The Palestinian question, domestic political considerations and Riyadh's position in the Islamic world continue to shape its approach to normalisation. Nevertheless, the growing security threat from the Houthis has created circumstances in which limited cooperation with Israel may prove useful.

In September 2026, Israeli news organisations reported that Saudi Arabia had approached Israel indirectly through the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), seeking intelligence support against the Houthis in Yemen. According to these reports, the discussions focused on protecting Saudi infrastructure and strategic installations from missile and drone attacks.

These reports warrant attention, but they also demand caution. They do not establish the full extent of any operational cooperation. Nor do they independently confirm that Mossad, Israel's external intelligence agency, is directly managing assistance to Saudi Arabia. Israeli intelligence activities involve multiple military and civilian organisations, and it would be misleading to attribute every reported intelligence contact to Mossad.

Despite these limitations, such cooperation remains geopolitically important. Saudi Arabia and Israel have different political priorities, but both are concerned about threats posed by Iranian-backed armed groups. The Houthis have demonstrated their ability to threaten shipping routes and regional infrastructure using missiles and drones. For Riyadh, useful intelligence may matter more than publicly identifying the country providing it.

The United States offers a potential framework for such cooperation. CENTCOM maintains military relationships across the region and can facilitate communication among partners whose political relations remain sensitive.

In my view, this is one of the most significant changes in the emerging Middle Eastern security system. Formal diplomatic recognition may no longer be essential for all forms of limited security cooperation. Governments can publicly disagree on major political questions while quietly exchanging information on threats to their national interests.

However, intelligence contacts should not be mistaken for a Saudi–Israeli military alliance. Saudi Arabia continues to build security partnerships with other countries, including Turkey and Pakistan. Israel may become a useful partner among several rather than the central pillar of Saudi defence.

The Houthi Conflict Is Changing Saudi Arabia's Security Calculations

Renewed fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has heightened the urgency of regional defence cooperation.

On October 2, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia was preparing a possible military offensive to weaken Houthi control around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key passage connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The reported plans involved Saudi-supported Yemeni forces, American intelligence assistance and support from other international partners.

The situation deteriorated further in early October. On October 8, Reuters reported renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi airports and infrastructure, including an incident in which a commercial aircraft caught fire at Riyadh airport. These developments heightened concerns about civilian safety, regional air travel and the possibility of a wider conflict.

The Houthis do not need to defeat the Saudi military in a conventional war to create serious problems. Their ability to launch drones and missiles, threaten shipping routes, and force costly defensive responses gives them considerable influence. A smaller armed organisation can impose substantial costs on a much wealthier country when it possesses weapons capable of reaching economically important targets.

Saudi Arabia must therefore manage several challenges simultaneously. It needs to protect its territory, secure maritime routes, support its allies in Yemen, and avoid being drawn into another prolonged military campaign.

Israel's intelligence experience may be useful in this context, but intelligence alone cannot resolve the Yemen conflict. Lasting security will also require political arrangements, stronger local institutions, and efforts to reduce the conditions that enable armed groups to sustain themselves.

Iran's Strategic Dilemma

Iran remains central to the evolving security environment.

For decades, Tehran has cultivated relationships with armed organisations across the Middle East. These relationships have enabled Iran to influence regional conflicts without always resorting to direct military confrontation.

The Houthis are part of this broader strategic picture, although they retain their own leadership, political interests and operational choices. Treating every Houthi action as a direct Iranian order would oversimplify the relationship.

Iran has strong reasons to oppose closer security cooperation between Israel and Gulf countries. Such cooperation could enhance regional missile defence, strengthen intelligence sharing, and make it harder for Iran or its partners to threaten critical infrastructure. At the same time, Tehran may view Israeli military activity near the Gulf as evidence that hostile powers are attempting to encircle it.

This creates a dangerous cycle. Gulf countries strengthen their defences out of fear of Iranian threats. Iran interprets these defensive arrangements as preparations against itself and may respond by increasing military pressure. The resulting tension encourages further cooperation between Israel and Arab governments.

In my assessment, the greatest danger is not necessarily a deliberate decision by either side to start a major war. The risk is that a limited attack, an intelligence failure, or a mistaken calculation could trigger a much larger confrontation. The region has already seen how quickly missile attacks, retaliatory strikes and threats to shipping can affect countries far beyond the original conflict.

Israel's expanding security role may strengthen deterrence, but military superiority cannot guarantee political stability. Deterrence works only when the parties involved understand the consequences of escalation and retain the means to keep a crisis from spiralling out of control.

The United States: The Connecting Power

The United States remains the most significant external military power in the Gulf security system. Washington maintains long-standing defence relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other regional partners. It also maintains a close strategic relationship with Israel.

This position gives the United States an unusual ability to facilitate security cooperation between countries that may not maintain normal diplomatic relations. CENTCOM's reported role in Saudi–Israeli intelligence discussions illustrates this possibility. American military channels can provide a practical way to exchange information without requiring immediate political normalisation.

However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that Washington is simply transferring responsibility for Gulf security to Israel. The United States continues to provide military capabilities, intelligence, diplomatic support and regional coordination. Its role remains essential, particularly when threats involve multiple countries or require cooperation across different military systems.

Israel may help strengthen this network, but it cannot replace American military power or the national defence capabilities of Gulf states.

I believe the more realistic development is a regional system in which several countries contribute different strengths. The United States provides coordination and major military support. Israel contributes advanced technology and intelligence experience. Gulf governments provide territory, resources, military forces and an understanding of local political conditions.

Such cooperation may improve security, but its success will depend on trust and clearly defined responsibilities. Without these, even a technologically advanced defence network can become politically fragile.

Turkey, Pakistan and the Limits of Israeli Influence

Israel is not the only country seeking a larger role in Middle Eastern security. Turkey and Pakistan have also emerged as key players in Saudi Arabia's defence calculations.

In October 2026, Reuters reported that Turkey was providing Saudi Arabia with technical and defensive assistance amid the renewed Houthi conflict. Turkey's foreign minister later said Ankara was considering further defensive support while ruling out an offensive military role. Pakistan has also strengthened its military ties with Saudi Arabia as part of emerging regional defence arrangements.

These developments show that Riyadh is not placing all its security expectations on a single partner.

Turkey has a growing defence industry and experience in drone warfare. Pakistan has longstanding military ties with Saudi Arabia. Both countries maintain political and religious ties that differ from Israel's relationship with the kingdom.

For Saudi Arabia, maintaining multiple partnerships offers greater flexibility. It can obtain technology, training and intelligence from diverse sources while preserving its diplomatic independence.

This reality places limits on the idea that Israel will become the dominant security provider across the Middle East. Israel may possess important technological advantages, but regional leadership requires more than military capability. It also requires political acceptance, reliable partnerships, and the ability to work with countries with different interests.

The Gulf states are unlikely to surrender their strategic independence to any external power, including Israel. They may instead prefer overlapping partnerships that let them get assistance without becoming overly dependent on any single country.

The Palestinian Question Cannot Be Ignored

Any discussion of Israel's growing regional role must also address the Palestinian question.

The Abraham Accords showed that some Arab governments were willing to establish relations with Israel without waiting for a final Israeli–Palestinian settlement. However, diplomatic normalisation did not resolve the conflict's political and humanitarian concerns.

The war in Gaza and subsequent regional confrontations have kept these concerns central to Middle Eastern politics.

In Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian question remains particularly sensitive. Riyadh's religious and political position entails responsibilities and expectations that differ from those of smaller Gulf states. Even countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel must consider public opinion and the wider consequences of Israeli military operations.

Security cooperation may therefore expand more quickly than political acceptance does.

In my view, Israel cannot build lasting regional influence through military technology alone. Its relationships with Arab countries will remain fragile if the Palestinian conflict persists without a credible political settlement. A country may be respected for its military strength yet still face deep opposition to its political decisions.

For Israel to become a trusted long-term security partner, military cooperation must ultimately be supported by diplomatic progress and a broader understanding of regional concerns.

The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb: Two Strategic Pressure Points

The Middle East's security challenges extend well beyond national borders.

Two maritime passages are particularly important: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and provides access to the Suez Canal route.

Threats to either passage can affect international shipping, energy supplies, insurance costs and trade. Iran's ability to threaten shipping around Hormuz and the Houthis' activities near Bab el-Mandeb create a difficult strategic environment for Gulf governments.

Israel's intelligence and defence capabilities may help improve warning systems and protect selected installations. However, no country can guarantee the complete security of these waterways using military technology alone.

Shipping companies, energy producers and international markets respond not only to actual attacks but also to the risk of disruption.

This is especially important for India, which depends heavily on maritime trade and imported energy. Instability in the Gulf can affect oil prices, transport costs and the security of Indian citizens working across the region.

From an Indian strategic perspective, stronger regional defence cooperation may be welcome if it reduces attacks and safeguards commercial routes. However, India also wants to prevent the Gulf from becoming a permanent battlefield between competing security blocs.

New Delhi maintains relationships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran. This gives India a strong reason to support regional stability without getting drawn into unnecessary political divisions.

Can Israel Become the Middle East's New Security Provider?

Evidence suggests Israel is moving toward a larger regional security role, but that role needs careful definition.

Its defence relationship with the UAE has evolved beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Reports on Saudi Arabia indicate that Israeli intelligence capabilities may also be considered useful by governments that have not formally recognised Israel. Such developments would have been difficult to imagine during earlier periods of Arab–Israeli hostility.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between becoming an important security partner and becoming the primary guarantor of regional security.

Israel has a limited geographical reach compared with the United States and faces significant security challenges of its own. Its military commitments, domestic political pressures and relations with neighbouring countries will influence the extent of assistance it can provide.

The Gulf states also have substantial resources and are developing their own defence capabilities. They are unlikely to accept a security arrangement that leaves them dependent on Israel's decisions.

I would therefore characterise Israel's emerging position as that of a selective regional security provider, rather than a replacement for the United States or a new military protector of the entire Gulf. This distinction separates a genuine strategic development from an exaggerated political narrative.

Israel's growing influence is real, but its future will depend as much on the choices of Arab governments as on Israeli military strength.

Conclusion: A New Security Order, but Not Yet a New Alliance

The Middle East is entering a period in which old political divisions are increasingly being tested by new security threats.

The UAE's cooperation with Israel and reports of Saudi–Israeli intelligence contacts indicate that practical security needs are reshaping regional relationships. The United States remains an important connector, while Turkey, Pakistan, and other countries are developing their own roles.

Iran and the Houthis continue to influence these decisions through their military capabilities and regional activities. At the same time, unresolved political disputes, particularly the Palestinian question, limit how far cooperation can develop.

Israel is no longer viewed solely through the traditional framework of Arab–Israeli confrontation. For some governments, it is also a source of military technology, intelligence and defensive expertise.

However, a new security partner does not automatically make the region more peaceful. Stronger defensive cooperation may deter attacks, but it can also heighten suspicion and prompt rival powers to respond.

My assessment is that the Middle East is not witnessing one security order replace another. It is witnessing the gradual formation of a more complex network of relationships in which governments cooperate on certain threats while continuing to disagree on major political questions.

Israel may become an increasingly important participant in this network, but its lasting influence will depend on whether military cooperation contributes to broader stability rather than merely preparing the region for its next confrontation.

The real test of Israel's emerging role will not be measured by how many defence systems it supplies or how much intelligence it shares. It will be whether that cooperation helps prevent wars, protect civilian lives, and create space for diplomacy.

A genuine security provider must ultimately contribute to security beyond the battlefield. That is the challenge that Israel, the Gulf states and the United States now face.

About the Author

Mitin Rajkuumar Sheth (Shanilohit) is an Indian author, geopolitical analyst, and strategic book reviewer who has been a freelance Senior Columnist with the Janmabhoomi Group of Newspapers for more than 25 years. He has written extensively on international affairs, geopolitics and strategic issues. His work also focuses on defence and military affairs, emerging technologies, global security, and India’s evolving role in the international order.

Selected References

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies — The Defence Dividend of the Abraham Accords, October 1, 2026

2. UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Statement on Media Reporting, September 8, 2026

3.         Israel Hayom — Saudi Arabia's Israel Appeal, September 16, 2026

4.         Reuters — Saudi Plans Against the Houthis, October 2, 2026

5.         Reuters — Houthi Attacks on Saudi Infrastructure, October 8, 2026

6.         Reuters — Turkey's Defensive Assistance to Saudi Arabia, October 8, 2026

7.         Reuters — Pakistan's Expanding Military Role in the Gulf, October 8, 2026

8.         IISS — US Defence Cooperation in the Gulf, September 28, 2026

Editorial Transparency & Full Disclosure

This is an independently researched and authored analysis. Advanced digital tools and AI were used solely for supplementary support tasks, including research cross-referencing, translation verification, image generation, and grammatical refinement. The core analytical insights, strategic conclusions, and creative direction are entirely the author’s own.

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